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I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout time, society has separately feared the destruction of
innocence and the manifestation of evil, never quite preparing for the
moments when the two coincide. In Wisconsin, and soon around the
country, widespread panic grew as information about the 2014 Slender
Man stabbing flooded news station and social media feeds.1 Two twelveyear-old girls had just attempted to kill their friend in order to please a
disturbing fictional character.2 Wisconsin’s statutory exclusion
mandates transfer for certain juvenile offenders once the child
celebrates their tenth birthday from the juvenile system to the adult
criminal system.3 Rather than focusing on the best interests of the two
offenders, the girls were transferred to and tried in adult court.4 On the
other hand, only 220 miles away and roughly fourteen months later, a
twelve-year-old girl stabbed and killed her step-mother due, in part, to a
*Rachel A. Martin, Juris Doctor 2021, UIC John Marshall Law School. Thank you to
my parents and sister who have loved, supported, and encouraged me throughout my
entire life, especially these past 3 years. Additionally, thank you to my Marquette
University professors for helping to inspire and further my career aspirations during
my undergraduate years, and thank you to my editors, the UIC John Marshall Law
Review Editorial Board, and my colleagues and professors for challenging me to
achieve this goal.
1. State v. Geyser, 394 Wis. 2d 96, 99 (Ct. App. 2020) (upholding the circuit
court’s decision to retain jurisdiction over Morgan Geyser who was “charged in adult
court with attempted first-degree intentional homicide” at the age of twelve); State v.
Weier, No. 2015AP1845-CR, 2016 WI App 67, *1-2 (WI Ct. App. Jul. 27, 2016)
(upholding the circuit court’s decision to retain jurisdiction over Anissa Weier who
was charged with attempted first-degree intentional homicide at the age of twelve).
2. Geyser, 394 Wis. 2d at 99; Weier, 2016 WI App 67 at *1-2; Cf. The Slender Man,
FANDOM WIKIA, creepypasta.wikia.com/wiki/The_Slender_Man [perma.cc/DZM5Z3CE] (last visited May 3, 2021) (explaining the origin of the Slender Man). Utilizing
an online forum called Something Awful, Eric Knudsen created the fictional character,
The Slender Man (aka Slenderman) in 2009. Id. The Slender Man meme has since
spread around the Internet in various forms but is mostly housed on a website titled
Creepypasta – a site dedicated to paranormal stories and short pieces of horror
fiction – which can be accessed by any computer that does not have personalized
restriction settings. Id. The legend says that once Slenderman opens his arms, his
victims – typically children – fall under a trance and become helpless, hypnotically
drawn into his arms where he kills them or brings them to another place or
dimension. Id. He has appeared throughout history, including references in Brazilian
cave paintings and Romanian mythology, and has been associated with multiple
crimes since his creation. Id.
3. Weier, 2016 WI App 67 at *1-2.
4. Id.
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preoccupation with the fictional character Laughing Jack.5 While news
stories, documentaries, and rumors of future movies about the Slender
Man stabbing still permeated media outlets, this similar Indiana case
went seemingly unnoticed.6 Based on Indiana’s juvenile transfer laws,
the court considered the best interest of the child and the public in
making its decision whether to transfer the juvenile offender from the
juvenile court system to be treated as an adult in the criminal court
system.7 In turn, the young girl remained in the juvenile justice system.8
Cases such as these propose the burning question: at what age is
juvenile transfer necessary and effective?
This Comment will assess the various forms of juvenile transfer, or
waiver, laws and evaluate their effectiveness in the juvenile population
through discussion of recidivism rates and psychological constructs.
Part II will evaluate the histories and goals of the juvenile and adult
justice systems and discuss psychological differences between adults
and juveniles. Further, it will introduce modern types of juvenile
transfer through examples from various midwestern states. Part III will
analyze psychological and deterrence research studies, and compare
5. State v. J.T., 121 N.E.3d 605, 607-08 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019); cf. Laughing Jack,
FANDOM WIKIA, villains.fandom.com/wiki/Laughing_Jack [perma.cc/C9F8-98XT] (last
visited May 3, 2021) (explaining the creation of Laughing Jack). Created by
Creepypasta user SnuffBomb, Laughing Jack first appeared as a Jack-in-the-box clown
who was tortured by his last owner. Id. Turned sinister due to this experience,
Laughing Jack now looks taller and more demonic. Id. He acts as an imaginary friend
but proceeds to kill children and terrorize families due to the trauma of being
neglected by his previous owner. Id. He has been associated with only this one
criminal case since his creation. Id.
6. See, e.g., BEWARE THE SLENDERMAN (HBO Films Jan. 27, 2017) (detailing the story
of Morgan Geyser and Anissa Weier stabbing their friend through interviews, news
coverage, and YouTube videos). See also Law & Order: Special Victims Unit:
Glasgowman’s Wrath (NBCUniversal television distribution Nov. 5, 2014)
(portraying two female juvenile friends who decide to scare one of the girl’s younger
sisters by searching for “Glasgowman” in a nearby park). The following morning, the
sister is found stabbed and eventually one of the two juvenile girls is charged with
stabbing the younger girl. Id. See also SLENDER MAN (Screen Gems Aug. 10, 2018)
(depicting a fictional story in which four friends from a small rural town who attempt
to conjure the Slender Man, leading one friend to go missing). See also Janes, DeAnna,
The Complete Timeline and True Story Behind the Slender Man Stabbing, OPRAH DAILY,
www.oprahdaily.com/entertainment/tv-movies/a29591703/slender-man-stabbingtrue-story [perma.cc/SX8S-94ZH] (Oct. 25, 2019) (discussing the background, events,
and initial court proceedings regarding the Slender Man attack); Slender: The Eight
Pages (Parsec Productions June 26, 2012) (providing video game players with a game
format in which they seek to avoid the Slender Man in a dark forest while collecting
certain “pages”); and Slender: The Arrival (Blue Isle Studios & Midnight City, Mar. 26,
2013) (providing video game players with a sequel to Slender: The Eight Pages).
7. J.T., 121 N.E.3d at 607-08.
8. Id. at 607-08, 614-15 (upholding the decision of the juvenile court which
considered the juvenile offender J.T.’s “undisputed . . . .symptoms of severe mental
illness, specifically [Dissociative Identity Disorder]” prior to the alleged crime,
“traumatic childhood” which included being raised by her mother who “married a
registered sex offender . . . [who] was physically abusive to [J.T.’s mother] in J.T.’s
presence”, time spent living with her father who “was verbally abusive to her,”
amongst other factors, when using its discretion to retain jurisdiction over J.T.).
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Illinois’, Wisconsin’s, Indiana’s, and Missouri’s juvenile transfer laws.
That section will evaluate how well those states’ laws align with the
pertinent research studies and the traditional goals of the juvenile
justice system. Finally, Part IV will propose law reforms that prioritize
public safety while also focusing on traditional juvenile justice goals of
deterring young offenders and considering their psychological wellbeing when deciding the appropriateness of transfer.

II.

BACKGROUND

This section will address the history of the juvenile justice system
as it has developed over time and how it compares to the adult criminal
justice system, as well as introduce the various types of transfer
methods. From its inception to its current form, the juvenile justice
system’s goals and methodologies developed and changed over time.
This Comment will analyze such changes and compare the current
juvenile system with the adult criminal system, highlighting recent
landmark cases.

A. The Juvenile Justice System: From Inception to Modern
Methodology
1.

America: From Punisher to Parent

Eighteenth-century America treated juveniles far differently than
most states do today.9 During that time, “children older than fourteen
were determined to be able to understand the difference between right
and wrong”10 and thus “were treated as adults in the justice system.”11
However, the justice system acknowledged that children under seven
(infants under the law) were too young to possess the criminal intent to
commit crimes.12 Children between the ages of seven and fourteen were
evaluated “by the court on a case-by-case basis.”13 Thus, while a child
aged six years, eleven months, and thirty days could not be prosecuted
9. Howard N. Snyder & Melissa Sickmund, Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 1999
National
Report,
1,
86
(1999),
www.ncjrs.gov/html/ojjdp/nationalreport99/chapter4.pdf [perma.cc/V2L2-CCGX]
(explaining how the early juvenile justice system focused on punishment while the
current system focuses on rehabilitation, and providing information and statistics
from the U.S. Department of Justice about juvenile offenders to be used in making
“informed policy decisions that will shape the juvenile justice system in the 21st
century”).
10. DUCHESS HARRIS & CARLA MOONEY, THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 16 (2019),
books.google.com/books?id=NtKhDwAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_atb
#v=onepage&q&f=false [perma.cc/2W4E-SM92] (discussing various aspects of the
United States juvenile justice system, including its history, its relations to gender and
race, and reform efforts).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 17.
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and punished under the criminal laws, “[c]hildren as young as seven . . .
could stand trial in criminal court for offenses committed and, if found
guilty, could be sentenced to prison or even to death.”14
As the United States approached the turn of the century in 1899, it
resorted first to its roots in an attempt to hold children accountable for
criminal wrongdoing.15 Under the British doctrine, parens patriae,
meaning “the State as parent,”16 Illinois developed the United States’
first juvenile court through the Illinois Juvenile Court Act of 1899.17
Rather than punishing “children who were not of full legal capacity,”18
this Chicago-based system acted as a new parent to the juveniles by
granting the State “the inherent power and responsibility to provide
protection for children whose natural parents were not providing
appropriate care or supervision.”19 The juvenile court was also
developed to provide a justice system for children based on the
widespread understanding that children “were not mature enough to
take responsibility for their actions”20 and “were still developing
intellectually and emotionally.”21
During the first half of the 20th century, the juvenile justice
system maintained jurisdiction over juvenile offenders aged eighteen
and younger.22 Contrary to earlier procedures, children under the age of
twelve could no longer be held in prisons.23 Based on an informal
evaluation of the best interests of both the specific juvenile and the
general public, the juvenile court could waive jurisdiction, thereby
transferring the juvenile offender to the adult criminal court.24 Thus, in
14. Snyder & Sickmund, supra note 9, at 86 (explaining how children below the
age of seven “were presumed to be incapable of criminal intent and were, therefore,
exempt from prosecution and punishment,” but beginning at age seven, children
were subject to the criminal court system and its punishments). See also HARRIS &
MOONEY, supra note 10, at 17 (discussing the United States’ view of children during
the 1800s). “New reforms established child labor laws, mandatory education
requirements, school lunches, and more . . . .Reformers believed these facilities were
needed to protect child offenders from adult criminals.” Id.
15. HARRIS & MOONEY, supra note 10, at 17-18 (explaining the development of the
juvenile justice system and its recognition that once offenders reached a specified
age, the courts could deem the offenders suitable for criminal prosecution with
certain safeguards, such as separation of some juvenile and adult offenders, in place).
16. Snyder & Sickmund, supra note 9, at 83-84.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. HARRIS & MOONEY, supra note 10, at 17-18.
21. Id.
22. Snyder & Sickmund, supra note 9, at 86 (explaining that “[o]nly if the juvenile
court waived its jurisdiction in a case could a child be transferred to criminal court
and tried as an adult”).
23. HARRIS & MOONEY, supra note 10, at 18 (discussing the changing age
requirements for prison incarceration). Harris and Mooney further recognize that at
this time, juvenile court records became confidential to “minimize the stigma
children experienced form being in the justice system.” Id. This procedure remains
intact today, whereas once the juvenile is transferred to the adult system, his or her
adult court records are accessible by the public. Id.
24. Id. at 18-19 (explaining that “[t]he courts tried to determine children’s best
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accordance with the parens patriae doctrine and the understanding of
juvenile’s limited legal capacity, the state acted as a parental figure,
making decisions for the child to best benefit the individual and protect
his or her best interests.25
2.

The Country in Panic

Until the 1950s, juvenile courts proceeded informally, with
judges using discretion when deciding the appropriateness of transfer,
as well as treatment for juvenile offenders.26 If a judge believed that a
child could be rehabilitated — no matter what type of offense was
alleged — the judge could offer “outcomes ranging from warnings to
probation supervision to training school confinement.”27 During the
latter half of the 20th century, young offenders remained in the juvenile
justice system at the court’s discretion in order to receive treatment.28
The juvenile court system developed into a more formal structure
pursuant to various landmark cases from the United States Supreme
Court, such as Gideon v. Wainwright, Kent v. United States, and In Re
Gault.29 To stop the ongoing “violations of children’s [constitutional]
rights”, hearings for all waiver issues and constitutional rights — similar
to those afforded to adult defendants — were granted to all alleged
juvenile offenders.30 As misconceptions about increasing juvenile crime
rates spread across 1980s America, public panic grew.31 States passed
more punitive statutes, including automatic transferring juvenile
“offenders charged with certain offenses” to the adult criminal justice

interests and followed an informal approach to cases”); Snyder & Sickmund, supra
note 9, at 86 (stating that “[t]ransfer decisions were made on a case-by-case basis
using a ‘best interests of the child and public’ standard, and were thus within the
realm of individualized justice”).
25. HARRIS & MOONEY, supra note 10, at 18 (discussing the United States’ view of
children during the 1800s); Snyder & Sickmund, supra note 9, at 83-84.
26. Snyder & Sickmund, supra note 9, at 87.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 87-88 (addressing the juvenile court system’s treatment-based
procedures and discuss’ legislative changes). For instance, Congress’ “Juvenile
Delinquency Prevention and Control Act of 1968[] recommended that children
charged with noncriminal . . . offenses be handled outside the court system.” Id. The
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 followed, requiring states
who accepted federal grants to “deinstitutionalize” noncriminal and non-offenders
and to separate juvenile and adult offenders. Id. at 88. While these recommendations
and mandates aligned with the juvenile justice system’s traditional goal of
rehabilitating young offenders, just a few years later in the 1980s, the public
perception ultimately changed towards enforcing law and order in the juvenile
justice sector. Id.
30. Id. at 19.
31. See Harris & Mooney, supra note 10, at 23-24 (explaining how as juvenile
crime rates began to rise, “state legislators…pass[ed] what were known as tough-oncrime policies”); Snyder & Sickmund, supra note 9, at 88 (explaining that “[a]lthough
there was substantial misperception regarding increases in juvenile crime, many
States responded by passing more punitive laws”).
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system and statutory exclusions that barred certain offenders from ever
stepping foot in the juvenile justice system.32

B. From Few Convictions to Overincarceration: A Nation
Afraid of Crime
A few decades before the nationwide panic over juvenile crime
rates, the public skeptically observed the criminal justice system’s
failures.33 In the early part of the 20th century, the United States faced
an era of increasingly violent crime and scarcely populated prisons.34
Due to policy makers’ war on crime, the court system increased its
efforts to hold offenders accountable for their crimes, but the nation’s
crime levels for certain offenses actually decreased dramatically.35 Still,
“patrolmen adopted more aggressive tactics, and prosecutors embraced
new strategies for winning convictions.”36 The states developed the “bighouse” era of prisons in which increased convictions led to quickly
growing prison populations that would persist for decades to come.37

C. Juvenile Justice vs. Criminal Consequences: Deterrence
Theories
Traditional goals and treatments promoted by the criminal justice
system differ from those of the juvenile justice system.38 In the adult
32. Snyder & Sickmund, supra note 9, at 88.
33. Jeffrey S. Adler, Less Crime, More Punishment: Violence, Race, and Criminal
Justice in Early Twentieth-Century America, 102 J. OF AM. HIST. 34, 36 (2015),
academic.oup.com/jah/article-pdf/102/1/34/2003472/jav173.pdf
[perma.cc/FND6-53SA] (explaining that “[t]he nation’s criminal justice system
appeared paralyzed [from 1900-1925] as violent crime soared while incarceration
and execution rates remained nearly flat”).
34. Id. (explaining that “[t]he violent-crime spike at the start of the twentieth
century reflected a confluence of social and cultural forces, including a surge in the
proportion of young men in the population, an increase in racial conflict and ethnic
tensions, and shifts in gender roles”).
35. Id. at 34, 37, 40-41 (stating that “[n]otwithstanding this plunge in serious
crime, legislators embarked on a far-reaching law-and-order crusade”). Adler
explained that legislators “passed draconian laws, closed legal loopholes, initiated a
massive prison-building program, limited the power of juries, and expanded federal
law enforcement, all in a frantic ‘war on crime.’” Id. at 34.
36. Id. at 40.
37. Id. at 46. See also STEPHEN D. COX, THE BIG HOUSE: IMAGE AND REALITY OF THE
AMERICAN
PRISON
10-11
(2009),
books.google.com/books?id=tkmfxJ5I4DUC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=f
alse [perma.cc/Q5E9-HPQW] (defining the “Big House” prison system as “America’s
notion of what a prison is supposed to be – a huge, tough, ostentatiously oppressive
pile or rock, bristling with bars and towers and rules and punishments,
overwhelming in its intent to intimidate).
38. Robert Hahn et al., Effects on Violence of Laws and Policies Facilitating the
Transfer of Youth from Juvenile to the Adult Justice System: A Report on
Recommendations of the Task Force on Community Preventive Services, 56 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 2 (2007), www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/rr/rr5609.pdf
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system, the fundamental goal is employing punishment tactics to
achieve various sub-goals, such as deterrence, incapacitation, and, if
possible, rehabilitation.39
Whereas the juvenile justice system
traditionally focuses on rehabilitation, as “juveniles are assumed to be
more amenable than adults to treatment.”40 While the juvenile justice
system generally works to deter individuals through rehabilitative
measures to make the juveniles functioning members of society postrelease, the adult criminal justice system focuses on deterrence through
punishment.41
The fundamental goals of the juvenile and criminal justice systems
differ, but both systems seek to prevent re-offending; the juvenile
system by rehabilitating juvenile offenders and the adult criminal
system by punishing offenders.42 General deterrence is the “imposition
of sanctions on one person [in order to] demonstrate to the rest of the
public the expected costs of a criminal act, and thereby discourage
criminal behavior in the general population.”43 Conversely, specific
deterrence is the theory that criminally punishing an individual offender
will deter that person from committing future criminal acts.44 However,
these distinct concepts often overlap in practice, and thus may be
considered as a single concept of deterrence when determining the
proper punishment in a criminal case.45

D. Psychological Variance Between Adults and Juveniles
In recent years, the United States Supreme Court has recognized
the differences in development and psychological growth between

[perma.cc/8MND-H36Q] (discussing the goals of the juvenile justice system); Glen A.
Ishoy, Reassessing the Purpose of Punishment: The Roles of Mercy and Victiminvolvement in Criminal Proceedings, 33 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 1 (2014), (discussing the
goals of the adult criminal justice system).
39. Ishoy, supra note 38, at 2.
40. Hahn et al., supra note 38, at 2.
41. Id. at 2; Ishoy, supra note 38, at 2.
42. Hahn et al., supra note 38, at 2 (explaining that “[i]n contrast to the adult
criminal court, which is oriented toward punishment, the traditional juvenile court
has acted ‘in the interests of the child’ and focused on rehabilitation rather than
punishment because juveniles are assumed to be more amendable than adults to
treatment”); Ishoy, supra note 38, at 2 (addressing the issue that the adult criminal
justice system focuses on punishment, with underlying goals of deterrence and
rehabilitation, rather than focusing mainly on rehabilitation).
43. Mark C. Stafford & Mark Warr, A Reconceptualization of General and Specific
Deterrence, 30 J. OF RES. IN CRIME AND DELINQ. 123, 123 (1993) (quoting American
criminologist Daniel S. Nagin and further distinguishing deterrence theories by
explaining “[w]hereas general deterrence refers to the effects of legal punishment on
the general public (i.e., potential offenders), specific deterrence pertains to the effects
of legal punishment on those who have suffered it (i.e., punished offenders . . .)”).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 133 (explaining how “there is no systematic theory of deterrence” and
thus the theoretic distinctions between general and specific deterrence have
provided little insight or applicability in the real world).
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juveniles and adults.46 In the landmark decision, Roper v. Simmons, the
Court evaluated a case in which seventeen-year-old Simmons was
charged with capital murder and sentenced to death upon turning
eighteen.47 On appeal, Simmons argued that an earlier case, Atkins v.
Virginia,48 “established that the Constitution prohibits the execution of a
juvenile who was under [eighteen] when he committed a crime.”49 The
Missouri Supreme Court granted Simmons relief, dismissing the death
penalty sentence and sentencing him to life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole.50 In its decision, the United States Supreme Court
noted three distinct differences between adults and juveniles that
indicate that the latter “cannot with reliability be classified among the
worst offenders.”51 First, juveniles are significantly less mature and
responsible than adults, causing them to commit reckless behavior at
higher rates than their older counterparts.52 Second, “juveniles are more
vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures,
including peer pressure.”53 Finally, the Court noted that juveniles have
underdeveloped personality traits compared to adults.54 Thus, the Court
46. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 48 (2010) (holding, “for a juvenile offender
who did not commit homicide the Eighth Amendment forbids the sentence of life
without parole”); and Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569-70 (2005) (finding, in
part, that as compared to adult offenders, juveniles tend to experience “[a] lack of
maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility. . . , are more venerable or
susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure. . .”,
and have a significantly less developed character than adult offenders).
47. Roper, 543 U.S. at 551.
48. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 308-09, 318-21 (2002) (explaining the case of
Atkins, a “mildly mentally retarded” man who was charged and convicted of
abduction, armed robbery, and capital murder). The United States Supreme Court
found that there are two reasons that mentally disabled people should not be subject
to the death penalty. Id. First, there is no evidence that doing so prompts general
deterrence of other mentally disabled people or serves as retribution for victims of
crime. Id. at 318-19. Second, mentally disabled offenders tend to have a reduced
capacity, which can cause them to “be less able to give more meaningful assistance to
their counsel and [be] typically poor witnesses, and their demeanor may create an
unwarranted impression of lack of remorse for their crimes.” Id. at 320-21.
49. Roper, 543 U.S. at 556-59. See also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308-09, 318-21 (holding
that capital “punishment is excessive” as applied to those with an intellectual
development disability, formally referred to as mental retardation).
50. Roper, 543 U.S. at 560.
51. Id. at 569.
52. Id. (noting specifically that: “In recognition of the comparative immaturity
and irresponsibility of juveniles, almost every State prohibits those under 18 years of
age from voting, serving on juries, or marrying without parental consent.”). This
interesting anecdote addresses the seemingly clashing relationship between legal
adulthood in everyday activities and legal adulthood when it comes to alleged
criminal activity. Id. See also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115-16 (1982)
(asserting that “[e]ven the normal 16-year-old customarily lacks the maturity of an
adult”). Interestingly, many states – including those compared in this comment –
continue to use 16-years-old as the benchmark for automatic and/or presumptive
transfer. Id.
53. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569.
54. Id. at 570 (explaining that “the character of a juvenile is not as well formed
as that of an adult” since “[t]he personality traits of juveniles are more transitory,

490

UIC John Marshall Law Review

[54:379

concluded that juveniles’ “irresponsible conduct is not as morally
reprehensible as that of an adult.”55
Graham v. Florida furthered Roper’s theories.56 In 2003, at age
sixteen, Graham was charged in Florida with attempted armed robbery,
and through statutory discretion, the prosecutor transferred the case to
the adult criminal court system.57 While the armed robbery offense was
“punishable by life imprisonment under Florida law[,]” Graham pleaded
guilty and received probation.58 Six months after his plea and
approximately one month before he turned eighteen, Graham
committed a home invasion robbery and a second robbery.59 During the
second robbery, one of Graham’s accomplices was shot and killed.60
Graham told the police that he had committed multiple robberies the
night before.61 Recognizing Graham’s violation of his probation, the trial
court sentenced him to life imprisonment for the 2003 armed burglary
and another fifteen years for the attempted armed robbery.62 On appeal
all the way to the United States Supreme Court, Graham argued that the
sentence violated the Eighth Amendment.63 The Court ruled in his favor,
noting in part that psychological and cognitive development is
dramatically different between a juvenile and an adult.64 Citing Roper,
the Court also concluded that “[f]rom a moral standpoint it would be
misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult, for a
greater possibility exists that a minor’s character deficiencies will be

less fixed”).
55. Id. at 569. See also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988)
(examining an Oklahoma case in which a fifteen-year-old was transferred to adult
court, convicted of first-degree murder, and sentenced to death). The Court
concluded that, for a variety of reasons, “less culpability should attach to a crime
committed by a juvenile than to a comparable crime committed by an adult.” Id. The
Court explained that “inexperience, less education, and less intelligence make the
teenager less able to evaluate the consequences of his or her conduct while at the
same time he or she is much more apt to be motivated by mere emotion or peer
pressure than is an adult.” Id.
56. Graham, 560 U.S. at 48.
57. Id. at 54.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 54-55.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 55.
62. Id. at 57 (noting that the Court admonished Graham that if he admitted to any
involvement in the illegal activity – considering his prior plea agreement and thus
being currently on probation – he could face a life sentence based on the earlier
charges that he had already pleaded to). Even so, Graham admitted to violating the
conditions of his probation by fleeing the police, which the Court ultimately
considered to be Graham “acknowledg[ing] violating his probation.” Id. Charged as an
adult, Graham’s potential sentence ranged from five years to life imprisonment. Id.
This sentencing structure, though not directly relevant to juvenile transfer,
exemplifies the stark contrast between a juvenile sentence and an adult sentence,
and thus the lifelong impact on an individual’s life. Id.
63. Id. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (stating, “Excessive bail shall not be required,
nor fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted”).
64. Graham, 560 U.S at 68.
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reformed.”65

E. Juvenile Transfer: Mandatory, Presumptive, or
Discretionary, In Illinois, Wisconsin, Missouri, and Indiana
For a juvenile to be tried in the adult criminal court system,
generally one of three circumstances must occur.66 The juvenile court
may waive its jurisdiction over the alleged offender and send the case to
an adult court that statutorily has jurisdiction over the case.67 However,
the adult court may automatically possess jurisdiction over the case
based on statutory exclusions that grant the adult criminal court, rather
than the juvenile court, original jurisdiction.68
1. The Distinction Between Mandatory Transfer and Statutory
Exclusion
Mandatory, or automatic, transfer laws are those which mandate
that offenders of a certain age who commit certain criminal acts be tried
in adult court.69 They begin in the juvenile justice system, but because
relevant factors are met, the judge has no choice but to transfer the case
to the adult court system.70 However, in some states, statutory
exclusions mandate that all proceedings in the case begin and end in the
adult criminal justice system.71 For instance, in Illinois, a juvenile “who
at the time of the offense was at least [sixteen] years of age and who is
charged with (i) first degree murder, (ii) aggravated criminal sexual
assault, or (iii) aggravated battery with a firearm” must be prosecuted in
the adult criminal court system, not the juvenile justice system.72 In
65. Id. at 68-69.
66. Benjamin Steiner et al., Legislative Waiver Reconsidered: General Deterrent
Effects of Statutory Exclusion Laws Enacted Post-1979, 23 JUSTICE Q. 34, 35 (2007).
67. Id.
68. Id. (explaining that for certain offenses, juveniles are statutorily, or
legislatively, excluded from the adult court, which is a concept developed in response
to concerns about the justice systems’ alleged “failure to reduce crime” and potential
discrimination).
69. Patrick Griffin et al., Trying Juveniles as Adults: An Analysis of State Transfer
Laws
and
Reporting,
U.S.
DEP'T
OF
JUSTICE
2
(2011), www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/232434.pdf
[perma.cc/MZ23-U9CV]
(discussing various mechanisms for trying juveniles as adults, such as “statutory
exclusion laws [which] grant criminal courts exclusive jurisdiction over certain
classes of cases involving juvenile-age offenders” and “Once an Adult, Always”
statutes “requiring criminal prosecution of any juvenile who has been criminally
prosecuted in the past – usually without regard to the seriousness of the current
offense”).
70. Id.
71. Steiner et al., supra note 66, at 35.
72. 705 ILCS 405/5-130(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2020) (addressing the concept of
“delinquent minor” under Illinois law). The relevant portion of the statute is as
follows:
The definition of delinquent minor under Section 5-120 [705 ILCS 405/5-
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2016, Illinois increased its age for statutory exclusion from age fifteen to
sixteen.73
Similarly, in Wisconsin, rather than using automatic waiver laws,
the courts employ a statutory exclusion.74 After their tenth birthday, a
child becomes a “juvenile delinquent” under the law if they commit
certain crimes such as first degree intentional homicide, attempted first
degree intentional homicide, first degree reckless homicide, or second
degree intentional homicide.75 The cases begin and end in the adult
criminal court system, never entering the juvenile justice system.76
Further, a juvenile of any age who commits an assault or battery against
an employee or officer of a correctional facility, or commits battery
against a probation or parole officer is subject to the statutory
120] of this Article shall not apply to any minor who at the time of an offense
was at least 16 years of age and who is charged with: (i) first degree murder,
(ii) aggravated criminal sexual assault, or (iii) aggravated battery with a
firearm as described in Section 12-4.2 or subdivision (e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3), or
(e)(4) of Section 12-3.05 [720 ILCS 5/12-3.05] where the minor personally
discharged a firearm as defined in Section 2-15.5 of the Criminal Code of 1961
or the Criminal Code of 2012 [720 ILCS 5/2-15.5 or 720 ILCS 5/1-1 et seq.].
These charges and all other charges arising out of the same incident shall be
prosecuted under the criminal laws of this State.
Id.
73. People v. Price, 2018 IL App (1st) 161202 (holding that where a now-sixteenyear-old had committed a crime at the age of fifteen and before the amended
automatic transfer age, the offender would be sentenced under the new law). See also
CST Editorial Board, When should a teen be tried as an adult? Let judges decide,
CHICAGO
SUN-TIMES
(Sept.
19,
2019),
chicago.suntimes.com/2019/9/19/20874164/juvenile-court-transfer-adult-courtlake-county-michael-nerheim-editorial [perma.cc/X7JE-LP6S] (discussing Illinois’
automatic transfer law and the related age change from fifteen to sixteen). This
article addresses the issue through the lens of a case in which a Lake County State’s
Attorney dismissed felony murder charges against five alleged juvenile offenders. Id.
It notes that a sixteen-year-old who is “tried in juvenile court for a gun crime faces a
maximum sentence of five years . . . But if tried and convicted in adult court, that
same teen could be looking at 45 years in prison.” Id. This anecdote demonstrates an
interesting dichotomy. A juvenile who commits a crime on his sixteenth birthday
faces a very different criminal reality than if he had don’t so just one day earlier.
Id.
74. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 938.183(1)(am) (LexisNexis 2021) (addressing “juveniles
under adult court jurisdiction”). The relevant portion of the statute is as follows:
(1) Juveniles under adult court jurisdiction. Notwithstanding ss. 938.12
(1) and 938.18, courts of criminal jurisdiction have exclusive original
jurisdiction over all of the following: . . . (am) A juvenile who is alleged to have
attempted or committed a violation of s. 940.01 or to have committed a
violation of s. 940.02 or 940.05 on or after the juvenile’s 10th birthday.
Id.
75. Id.
76. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 938.12(1) (LexisNexis 2021) (stating, “(1) In general. The
court has exclusive jurisdiction, except as provided in ss. 938.17, 938.18,
and 938.183, over any juvenile 10 years of age or older who is alleged to be
delinquent”).
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exclusion.77 Though similar to mandatory transfer, these two processes
remain distinct.78 Wisconsin also allows for a reverse waiver in limited
circumstances.79 “[T]he [criminal] court shall retain jurisdiction” so long
as three elements are met: the juvenile delinquent is subject to the
statutory exclusion rule, a preliminary hearing occurs, and the court
finds there is probable cause.80 However, the juvenile may remain in the
juvenile system if “the juvenile proves by a preponderance”81 that the
adult system would not provide the juvenile with adequate and
necessary treatment; that “transferring the jurisdiction . . . would not
depreciate the seriousness of the offense;”82 and “that [the adult system]
77. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 938.183(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2021) (addressing “juveniles
under adult court jurisdiction”). The relevant portion of the statute is as follows:
(1) Juveniles under adult court jurisdiction. Notwithstanding ss. 938.12
(1) and 938.18, courts of criminal jurisdiction have exclusive original
jurisdiction over all of the following: . . . (a) A juvenile who has been
adjudicated delinquent and who is alleged to have violated s. 940.20
(1) or 946.43 while placed in a juvenile correctional facility, a juvenile
detention facility, or a secured residential care center for children and youth
or who has been adjudicated delinquent and who is alleged to have
committed a violation of s. 940.20 (2m).
Id.
78. Transfer, NAT’L JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., njdc.info/transfer [perma.cc/R3L7WNLM] (last visited Mar. 14, 2021) (explaining how statutory exclusions, or
automatic waiver, require certain juvenile cases to be charged and tried solely in the
adult criminal system, whereas some mandatory transfer statutes permit cases to
begin in the juvenile system and then be transferred to the criminal system). See WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 970.032(2)(a-c) (LexisNexis 2021) (addressing transfer of jurisdiction).
The relevant portion of the statute is as follows:
(2) If the court finds probable cause to believe that the juvenile has
committed the violation of which he or she is accused under the
circumstances specified in s. 938.183 (1) (a), (am), (ar), (b) or (c), the court
shall determine whether to retain jurisdiction or to transfer jurisdiction to
the court assigned to exercise jurisdiction under chs. 48 and 938. The court
shall retain jurisdiction unless the juvenile proves by a preponderance of the
evidence all of the following: (a) That, if convicted, the juvenile could not
receive adequate treatment in the criminal justice system. (b) That
transferring jurisdiction to the court assigned to exercise jurisdiction under
chs. 48 and 938 would not depreciate the seriousness of the offense. (c) That
retaining jurisdiction is not necessary to deter the juvenile or other juveniles
from committing the violation of which the juvenile is accused under the
circumstances specified in s. 938.183 (1) (a), (am), (ar), (b) or (c), whichever
is applicable.
Id.
79. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 970.032(2)(a-c) (LexisNexis 2021) (addressing transfer of
jurisdiction and the reversal of such funding where “[t]he court shall retain
jurisdiction [over a juvenile transferred to the adult criminal court] unless the
juvenile proves by a preponderance of the evidence three elements”).
80. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 970.032(2) (LexisNexis 2021) (addressing transfer of
jurisdiction).
81. Id.
82. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 970.032(2)(b) (LexisNexis 2021) (addressing the elements
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retaining jurisdiction is not necessary to deter the juvenile or other
juveniles from committing the violation of which the juvenile is
accused.”83 While the juvenile is statutorily required to be tried in the
adult criminal court system, there remains potential for him or her to be
waived from the criminal court’s jurisdiction to the juvenile court’s
jurisdiction.84
Another form of statutory exclusion is the concept of “Once an
Adult, Always,” where juveniles who have previously been transferred
to or otherwise tried in the adult criminal court system will be
“automatically transferred [to the adult system] for any future
offending.”85 For example, a Missouri statute states that once a child has
been found guilty in the adult criminal court system, “the jurisdiction of
the juvenile court over the child is forever terminated” if that child
reoffends in the future.86 Similarly, Indiana juvenile courts must waive
jurisdiction in cases where the juvenile “is charged with an act which
would be a felony if committed by an adult”87 and “the child has
previously been convicted of a felony or a nontraffic misdemeanor.”88
Thus, some states, such as Illinois and Wisconsin, employ
automatic transfer in the form of statutory exclusion such that offenders
who attain a certain age and who commit specified offenses are
automatically tried in adult court.89 Other states, such as Missouri and
the juvenile needs to prove to reverse a transfer, specifically “[t]hat transferring
jurisdiction to the court assigned to exercise jurisdiction under chs. 48 and 938
would not depreciate the seriousness of the offense”).
83. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 970.032(2)(c) (LexisNexis 2021) (addressing the elements
the juvenile needs to prove to reverse a transfer, specifically “[t]hat retaining
jurisdiction is not necessary to deter the juvenile or other juveniles from committing
the violation of which the juvenile is accused under the circumstances specified in s.
938.183 (1) (a), (am), (ar), (b) or (c), whichever is applicable”).
84. Transfer, supra note 78.
85. Hahn et al., supra note 38, at 2-3 (discussing the goals of the juvenile justice
system).
86. MO. REV. STAT. § 211.071(9) (LexisNexis 2020) (addressing the circumstances
when a child is barred from adult court after conviction for an earlier crime). The
relevant portion of the statute is as follows:
9. When a petition has been dismissed thereby permitting a child to be
prosecuted under the general law and the prosecution of the child results in a
conviction, the jurisdiction of the juvenile court over that child is forever
terminated, except as provided in subsection 10 of this section, for an act that
would be a violation of a state law or municipal ordinance. Id.
87. BURNS IND. CODE ANN. § 31-30-3-6(1) (LexisNexis 2020) (stating, “[u]pon
motion by the prosecuting attorney, the juvenile court shall waive jurisdiction if it
finds that: (1) the child is charged with an act which would be a felony if committed
by an adult”).
88. BURNS IND. CODE ANN. § 31-30-3-6(2) (LexisNexis 2020) (stating, “[u]pon
motion by the prosecuting attorney, the juvenile court shall waive jurisdiction if it
finds that: . . . (2) the child has previously been convicted of a felony or a nontraffic
misdemeanor”).
89. 705 ILCS 405/5-130(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2021) (addressing the concept of
“delinquent minor” under Illinois law); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 938.12(1) (LexisNexis 2021)
(stating, “(1) In general. The court has exclusive jurisdiction, except as provided in ss.
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Indiana, employ another form of statutory exclusion such that juveniles
who have already been tried in adult court will automatically be tried
there in the future if they engage in additional criminal activities.90
2. Presumptive Transfer
Some states also employ presumptive waiver statutes.91 Based on
the alleged offender’s age, the type of offense, and other statutory
requirements, transfer is presumed by the court to be the appropriate
procedure.92 While a rebuttable presumption exists in favor of the
juvenile’s transfer, the alleged offender has the right to present evidence
that transfer is not appropriate and the judge may take that evidence
into consideration.93 However, if the juvenile fails to do so, the judge will
have no choice but to transfer the case to the adult criminal court
system.94
In Illinois, a prosecutor may file a petition for a juvenile to be
transferred based on the commission of certain felonies that do not fall
under the statutory exclusion.95 Certain criteria must be met for the
938.17, 938.18, and 938.183, over any juvenile 10 years of age or older who is
alleged to be delinquent”); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 938.183(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2021)
(addressing “Juveniles under adult court jurisdiction”).
90. MO. REV. STAT. § 211.071(9) (LexisNexis 2020) (addressing the circumstances
when a child is barred from adult court after conviction for an earlier crime); BURNS
IND. CODE ANN. § 31-30-3-6 (LexisNexis 2020) (addressing a juvenile court’s waiver of
jurisdiction).
91. Griffin et al., supra note 69, at 4 (explaining, “presumptive waiver laws define
a category of cases in which waiver from juvenile to criminal court is presumed
appropriate” and such laws “leave the decision in the hands of a judge but weight in
in favor of transfer”).
92. Id.; cf. Hahn et al., supra note 38, at 3 (stating, “[w]ith lowered age of adult
court jurisdiction, states set the age at which a person is considered responsible for
criminal actions, and no longer eligible for juvenile court, to an age younger than the
traditional age of 18 years”). Presumptive transfers are based upon individual states
legislatively requiring certain offenders to be transferred if the defendant does not
provide reasonable and sufficient rebuttal. Id.
93. Griffin et al., supra note 69, at 4.
94. Id.
95. 705 ILCS 405/5-805(2)(a) (LexisNexis 2021) (addressing Illinois’
presumptive transfer of juvenile offenders). The relevant portion of the statute is as
follows:
(2) Presumptive transfer.
(a) If the State’s Attorney files a petition, at any time prior to commencement
of the minor’s trial, to permit prosecution under the criminal laws and the
petition alleges a minor 15 years of age or older of an act that constitutes a
forcible felony under the laws of this State, and if a motion by the State’s
Attorney to prosecute the minor under the criminal laws of Illinois for the
alleged forcible felony alleges that (i) the minor has previously been
adjudicated delinquent or found guilty for commission of an act that
constitutes a forcible felony under the laws of this State or any other state
and (ii) the act that constitutes the offense was committed in furtherance of
criminal activity by an organized gang, and, if the juvenile judge assigned to
hear and determine motions to transfer a case for prosecution in the criminal
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court to grant the transfer.96 First, the juvenile must have a criminal
record in which the juvenile was either “adjudicated delinquent or
found guilty”97 for a felony under Illinois criminal law.98 Second, the
charged crime “was committed in furtherance of criminal activity by an
organized gang.”99 Finally, the judge must determine that the allegations
made and evidence presented in the motion for transfer demonstrate
“that there is probable cause to believe that the allegations in the
petition and motion are true.”100 While a judge may use discretion when
evaluating the evidence offered by the juvenile, a rebuttable resumption
that the juvenile should be transferred persists.101
In Indiana, the court must transfer alleged offenders who are
charged with Class A or Class B felonies so long as certain criteria are
met.102 First, the act would have to be a Level 1, 2, 3, or 4 felony,
court determines that there is probable cause to believe that the allegations
in the petition and motion are true, there is a rebuttable presumption that the
minor is not a fit and proper subject to be dealt with under the Juvenile
Justice Reform Provisions of 1998 (Public Act 90-590), and that, except as
provided in paragraph (b), the case should be transferred to the criminal
court.
Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See Rachel Fugett, Stop Presumptive Transfers: How Forcing Juveniles to
Prove They Should Remain In The Juvenile Justice System Is Inconsistent With Roper v.
Simmons & Graham v. Florida, 48 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 365 (2014) (discussing modernday presumptive transfer and proposing that Illinois eradicate this type of transfer as
such would not prevent Illinois adult court from hearing cases with juvenile
offenders, but rather would make transfer more discretionary and less mandatory).
The comment argues that presumptive transfer – by presenting a rebuttable
presenting in favor of transfer – violates a juvenile offender’s Eighth Amendment
right against cruel and unusual punishment, considering the Amendment’s
presumption that “a criminal offender's punishment should be proportional to both
the crime and his or her culpability.” Id. at 375.
102. BURNS IND. CODE ANN. § 31-30-3-5 (LexisNexis 2020) (addressing Indiana’s
waiver of jurisdiction for certain offenders who committed specific levels of
offenses). The relevant portion of the statute is as follows:
Except for those cases in which the juvenile court has no jurisdiction in
accordance with IC 31-30-1-4, the court shall, upon motion of the prosecuting
attorney and after full investigation and hearing, waive jurisdiction if it finds
that: (1) the child is charged with an act that, if committed by an adult, would
be: (A) a Level 1 felony, Level 2 felony, Level 3 felony, or Level 4 felony,
except a felony defined by IC 35-48-4; (B) involuntary manslaughter as a
Level 5 felony under IC 35-42-1-4; or (C) reckless homicide as a Level 5
felony under IC 35-42-1-5; (2) there is probable cause to believe that the
child has committed the act; and (3) the child was at least sixteen (16) years
of age when the act charged was allegedly committed; unless it would be in
the best interests of the child and of the safety and welfare of the community
for the child to remain within the juvenile justice system.
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involuntary manslaughter, or reckless homicide under Indiana criminal
statute.103 Second, “there is probable cause to believe that the child has
committed the act; and . . . the child was at least [sixteen] years of age
when the act charged was allegedly committed.”104 Additionally, the
court must transfer alleged offenders who are charged with murder if
certain criteria are met.105 The act would be considered murder if it had
been committed by an adult, “there is probable cause to believe that the
child has committed the act; and…the child was at least twelve (12)
years of age when the act charged was allegedly committed.”106
However, the juvenile court may override this presumptive transfer if it
decides that doing so is in the child’s and the community’s best
interest.107
Id. See also Criminal Law: About Felonies in Indiana, THE LAW OFFICE OF MELISSA
WINKLER-YORK, LLC., www.winkleryorklaw.com/areas/criminal-defense/felony.html
[perma.cc/X86G-89QY] (last visited Mar. 24, 2021) (explaining that “crimes
committed prior to July 2014” were classified by letters, with Class A and Class B
felonies “carry[ing] [] penalt[ies] of 20 to 50 years” and “6 to 20 years” respectively,
and crimes committed post-July 2014 are classified by numbers, with Level 1, Level
2, and Level 3 felonies “carr[ying] [] penalt[ies] of 20 to 50 years . . . 10 to 30 years . . .
[and] 3 to 20 years” respectively).
103. BURNS IND. CODE ANN. § 31-30-3-5(1)(A-C) (LexisNexis 2020) (addressing
waiver of jurisdiction for juvenile offenders who are charged with Levels 1, 2, 3, or 4
felonies; involuntary manslaughter; or reckless homicide).
104. BURNS IND. CODE ANN. § 31-30-3-5(2-3) (LexisNexis 2020) (addressing two
elements of the waiver statute for certain offenders for specific levels of offenses,
specifically the requirement of probable cause and the minimum age of sixteen).
105. BURNS IND. CODE ANN. § 31-30-3-4 (LexisNexis 2020) (addressing the transfer
rule when a juvenile is alleged to have committed murder). The relevant portion of
the statute is as follows:
Upon motion of the prosecuting attorney and after full investigation and
hearing, the juvenile court shall waive jurisdiction if it finds that: (1) the child
is charged with an act that would be murder if committed by an adult;
(2) there is probable cause to believe that the child has committed the act;
and (3) the child was at least twelve (12) years of age when the act charged
was allegedly committed; unless it would be in the best interests of the child
and of the safety and welfare of the community for the child to remain within
the juvenile justice system.
Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.; Burns Ind. Code Ann. § 31-30-3-5 (LexisNexis 2020) (addressing
Indiana’s statute for waiver of jurisdiction when there is probable cause to believe a
juvenile, at least sixteen years of age, has committed certain offenses, such as
involuntary manslaughter or reckless homicide). See also Marilyn Odendahl, Juvenile
waiver bill stirs controversy at Statehouse, I.N. LAWYER (Apr. 2, 2019),
www.theindianalawyer.com/articles/49861-juvenile-waiver-bill-stirs-controversyat-statehouse [perma.cc/3S5K-HXZ6] (discussing Indiana Senate Bill 279 which
would change the law, such that 12-year-old alleged offenders who attempted to
commit murder, not only those who did commit murder, to be waived into adult
court). The article examines the case which prompted the Bill – a school shooting in
which the offender, a 14-year-old boy, was unable to be transferred to adult court
based on Indiana’s laws since he only “gravely injured” two people but did not in fact
kill them. Id. This recent potential change in the law is important because its
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Thus, while Wisconsin and Missouri do not employ presumptive
transfer, Illinois and Indiana presume transfer for juveniles of specified
ages who commit certain offenses.108 These statutes permit courts to
consider additional factors, such as “the best interests of the child and of
the safety and welfare of the community for the child to remain within
the juvenile justice system.”109
3.

Discretionary Transfer

Finally, discretionary transfer reflects the oldest and most
traditional form of juvenile court hearings in which a court may waive a
juvenile to adult court on a discretionary, case-by-case basis.110
Depending on the statutory language, a court may consider various
factors when deciding whether waiver is appropriate in the given
case.111 These factors include the “nature of the alleged crime and the
individual youth’s age, maturity, history, and rehabilitative
prospects.”112 While many states employ discretionary transfer hearings
in addition to other transfer mechanisms – such as automatic and
presumptive transfer – some states, including Missouri, “rely solely on
traditional hearing-based judicially controlled forms of transfer.”113
In Missouri, if any child commits one of a variety of serious
offenses or has committed two or more prior unrelated offenses that
would be felonies in the adult system, then the court shall order a
hearing and may, in its discretion, transfer the case.114 A 2018

controversial consequences, though ominous, still somewhat align with traditional
juvenile transfer mechanisms in which a judge may utilize discretion when deciding
whether to transfer the alleged offender. Id.
108. 705 ILCS 405/5-805(2)(a) (LexisNexis 2021) (addressing Illinois’
presumptive transfer of juvenile offenders); BURNS IND. CODE ANN. § 31-30-3-4(1-3)
(LexisNexis 2020) (addressing the presumptive of a juvenile, aged twelve years or
older, who is alleged to have committed murder); BURNS IND. CODE ANN. § 31-30-3-5
(LexisNexis 2020) (addressing Indiana’s presumptive waiver of jurisdiction for
juveniles, aged sixteen years or older, who is alleged to have committed certain levels
of felonies, such as involuntary manslaughter or reckless homicide).
109. BURNS IND. CODE ANN. § 31-30-3-4 (LexisNexis 2020); Burns Ind. Code Ann.
§ 31-30-3-5 (LexisNexis 2020).
110. Griffin et al., supra note 69, at 2 (discussing waiver throughout time and in
modern context). It states that “most states set a minimum threshold for waiver
eligibility: generally, a minimum age and a specified type or level of offense, and
sometimes a sufficiently serious record of previous delinquency” but warned that
“[w]aiver thresholds are often quite low . . .” Id. It goes on to state, “[a]s a practical
matter . . . waivers are likely to be relatively rare… the proportion of juvenile cases in
which prosecutors seek waiver is not known, but waiver is granted in less than 1% of
petitioned delinquency cases.” Id. These facts are important to note because even
while waiver statutes may be concerning, in actuality, they are not as pervasive and
detrimental as one may assume.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. MO. REV. STAT. § 211.071(1) (LexisNexis 2020) (addressing Missouri’s
discretionary transfer procedure). The relevant portion of the statute is as follows:
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amendment to the Missouri statute changed the age at which a teenager
is considered an adult under the law from seventeen to eighteen.115
Illinois, Wisconsin, and Indiana employ discretionary transfer statutes in
addition to other transfer mechanisms, with discretionary hearings for
certain statutorily specified crimes beginning at age thirteen in Illinois,
fourteen or fifteen in Wisconsin, and fourteen or sixteen in Indiana.116
1. If a petition alleges that a child between the ages of twelve and eighteen has
committed an offense which would be considered a felony if committed by an
adult, the court may, upon its own motion or upon motion by the juvenile
officer, the child or the child’s custodian, order a hearing and may, in its
discretion, dismiss the petition and such child may be transferred to the court
of general jurisdiction and prosecuted under the general law; except that if a
petition alleges that any child has committed an offense which would be
considered first degree murder under section 565.020, second degree
murder under section 565.021, first degree assault under section 565.050,
forcible rape under section 566.030 as it existed prior to August 28, 2013,
rape in the first degree under section 566.030, forcible sodomy under section
566.060 as it existed prior to August 28, 2013, sodomy in the first degree
under section 566.060, first degree robbery under section 569.020 as it
existed prior to January 1, 2017, or robbery in the first degree under section
570.023, distribution of drugs under section 195.211 as it existed prior to
January 1, 2017, or the manufacturing of a controlled substance under section
579.055, or has committed two or more prior unrelated offenses which
would be felonies if committed by an adult, the court shall order a hearing,
and may in its discretion, dismiss the petition and transfer the child to a court
of general jurisdiction for prosecution under the general law.
Id.
115. MO. REV. STAT. § 211.031 (Amendment Notes) (LexisNexis 2020) (discussing
the 2018 amendment which, in part, “substituted “eighteen years” for “seventeen
years” in various sections of the statute).
116. 705 ILCS 405/5-805(3)(a) (LexisNexis 2021) (addressing Illinois’
discretionary transfer procedure). The relevant portion of the statute is as follows:
(3) Discretionary transfer. (a) If a petition alleges commission by a minor 13
years of age or over of an act that constitutes a crime under the laws of this
State and, on motion of the State’s Attorney to permit prosecution of the
minor under the criminal laws, a Juvenile Judge assigned by the Chief Judge of
the Circuit to hear and determine those motions, after hearing but before
commencement of the trial, finds that there is probable cause to believe that
the allegations in the motion are true and that it is not in the best interests of
the public to proceed under this Act, the court may enter an order permitting
prosecution under the criminal laws.
Id.; BURNS IND. CODE ANN. § 31-30-3-3 (LexisNexis 2020) (addressing the ability
for a juvenile court to waive jurisdiction). The relevant portion of the statute is as
follows:
Upon motion of the prosecuting attorney and after a full investigation and a
hearing, the court may waive jurisdiction if it finds that: (1) the child is
charged with an act that, if committed by an adult, would be a felony under IC
35-48-4; (2) there is probable cause to believe that the child has committed
the act; (3) the child was at least sixteen (16) years of age when the act was
allegedly committed; and (4) it is in the best interests of the safety and the
welfare of the community for the child to stand trial as an adult.
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F. Where to Go from Here
From state to state, juvenile transfer statutes vary dramatically.117
For instance, if a twelve-year-old commits a heinous felony in Indiana,
her life will likely end up significantly different than if she had done so
just a couple of states away in Wisconsin.118 Considering a juvenile’s
psychological development and limited evidence that transfer is an
effective deterrent, these stark differences create a concerning reality.119
Thus, it is important to compare state statutes to one another and to
traditional transfer mechanisms to determine how we as a society can
better our justice systems and achieve the ultimate goal of juvenile
rehabilitation.120

III. ANALYSIS
This section will evaluate cognitive and psychological research and
deterrence theory research as such relate to juvenile transfer. Then, it
will examine Illinois, Indiana, Wisconsin, and Missouri transfer laws as
they compare with both research regarding juveniles’ cognitive and
emotional development and deterrence theories and currently
employed transfer mechanisms.

A. Important Psychological Considerations When Evaluating
Transfer
1.

Cognitive Development: Brain Chemistry & Criminal Conduct

Psychological development in juveniles from ages ten to eighteen
varies greatly and demonstrates the importance of considering the

Id.; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 938.18(LexisNexis 2021).
117. Griffin et al., supra note 69, at 2, 4-5 (discussing presumptive transfer,
statutory exclusions, and prosecutorial discretion, and depicting various tables which
include specifics about states’ individual transfer laws).
118. Geyser, 394 Wis. 2d at 99 (discussing the “Slender Man” stabbing by two
twelve-year-old offenders, including the defendant Morgan Geyser, and a Wisconsin
court’s decision to uphold her transfer to the adult criminal court system); J.T., 121
N.E.3d at 605 (discussing a case in which a twelve-year-old stabbed her stepmother,
and the Indiana court’s decision to allow the juvenile court, rather than the adult
criminal court, to retain jurisdiction over the case); Weier, 2016 WI App 67 at *1-2
(discussing the “Slender Man” stabbing by two twelve-year-old offenders, including
the defendant Anissa Weier, and a Wisconsin court’s decision to uphold her transfer
to the adult criminal court system).
119. Graham, 560 U.S. at 82 (holding that “[t]he [Eighth Amendment] prohibits
the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not
commit homicide”); Roper, 543 U.S. at 578 (holding “[t]he Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments forbid imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under
the age of 18 when their crimes were committed).
120. Griffin et al., supra note 69, at 2, 4-5.
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mental experience and cognitive functioning when examining a
juvenile’s actions.121 Studies on neurological and psychological
development indicate that “youths in early- to mid-adolescence lack
cognitive understanding of consequences, are hard-wired to engage in
risky behavior, and are more influenced by peers than by any other
environmental factor.”122 Researchers recognize that it is not possible to
determine when a juvenile actually “attain[s] adult-like psychological
capacities,”123 which would establish the juvenile’s ability to develop the
level of culpability necessary to be charged as an adult.124 Some critics
may argue that these studies are indeterminate and should not be
utilized in establishing laws. However, researchers Elizabeth Scott and
Thomas Grisso found that “youths under age fourteen differ significantly
from adolescents sixteen to eighteen years of age in their level of
psychological development.”125 Youths between the ages of fourteen and
sixteen share developmental characteristics with both their younger and
older cohorts.126 Similarly, in a 2019 study, the United Nations
recommended that considering research in the field of adolescent
cognitive development, “[s]tates should establish a minimum age of
criminal responsibility, which shall not be below [fourteen] years of
age.”127

121. Janet C. Hoeffel, The Jurisprudence of Death and Youth: Now the Twain Should
Meet, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 29, 40 (2013) (acknowledging that some states allow
transfer for even nonviolent felonies, such as certain property and drug offenses, and
arguing that “[a]llowing transfer at such young ages and for such minor offenses
means it is practically certain that transfer is not being authorized for the worst of
the worst”). This type of transfer is seen in “Once an Adult, Always” concepts, such as
those employed in Indiana and Missouri, which allow juveniles who are being
charged with a felony – without distinction as to violent or nonviolent – to be
automatically tried in adult courts. Id. See also Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso,
Developmental Incompetence, Due Process, and Juvenile Justice Policy, 83 N.C. L. REV.
793, 813 (2005) (noting that “[i]ntellectual capacities increase in childhood and into
adolescence; although there is must variability among individuals, children and
younger teens differ significantly from adults in their cognitive function”). Further,
Scott & Grisso state, “[b]eyond the accumulation of knowledge and experience,
intellectual development in adolescence also involves improvements in basis
information processing skills, including organization, attention and short and long
term memory.” Id.
122. Hoeffel, supra note 121, at 40.
123. Scott & Grisso, supra note 121, at 811.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 811, 814 (emphasis added) (noting that “[d]uring the years between
twelve and fifteen, impulse control improves, as adolescents struggle with new
demands for self-direction and self-management; for some adolescents the process
extends well into middle or late adolescence”). The information demonstrates that
peak growth and development averages over the course of a three year span, but
such is not absolute and can vary offender by offender, and thus is it important to
take this factor into consideration when evaluating their psychological development.
Id.
126. Id.
127. Manfred Nowak, Report of the Independent Expert Leading the United Nations
Global Study on Children Deprived of Liberty, UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY 1, 20
(July 11, 2019), reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/A_74_136_E.pdf
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Further, psychosocial studies have addressed anti-personality
disorder as it relates to juvenile behavior, psychological and social
development, criminal behavior, and incorrigibility.128 Research
indicates that the total number and frequency of criminal offenses peaks
during adolescence – most notably around age seventeen.129 These rates
“drop precipitously in young adulthood”130 in correlation with a
dramatic decrease in antisocial tendencies and increased maturity.131
“Individuals with antisocial personality disorder often violate the law,
becoming criminals.”132 Antisocial personality disorder is “a mental
[perma.cc/TS2V-HKWZ] (reporting the findings of the Independent Expert appointed
by the Secretary-General, as instructed by the General Assembly, who analyzed
global data to evaluate the circumstances of children deprived of liberty). In addition
to the general findings, Nowak offered recommendations for means of depriving
children of liberty, such as setting the absolute minimum age at which a child should
be subject to criminal liability, and the best non-custodial practices that are
implemented around the world. Id. These recent findings offer insight into the
modern global society’s view of juvenile justice, and thus creates a recent and
relevant basis of comparison for United States transfer laws. Id.
128. Beth A. Colgan, Constitutional Line Drawing at the Intersection of Childhood
and Crime, 9 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 79, 84, n.21 (2013) (explaining that psychological
research demonstrates that “even ‘older adolescents (aged 16-17) might have logical
reasoning skills that approximate those of adults, but nonetheless lack the abilities to
exercise self-restraint, to weigh risk and reward appropriately, and to envision the
future that are just as critical to mature judgment’”). The research further explores
antisocial personality in juveniles, finding “that most youth age out of antisocial
activities as they move into adulthood and that it is practically impossible to
distinguish those youth who are incorrigible from those who are not. Id. See also
incorrigible, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY (Oct. 22, 2019), www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/incorrigible [perma.cc/U2F5-W9JU] (defining “incorrigible”
as “incapable of being corrected or amended: such as a(1) not reformable:
depraved[,] (2) delinquent”).
129. Terrie E. Moffitt, Adolescent-Limited and Life-Course-Persistent Antisocial
Behavior: A Developmental Taxonomy, 100 PSYCHOL. REV. 674, 675 (1993) [hereinafter
Moffitt I].
130. Id. (noting that “The majority of criminal offenders are teenagers; by the
early 20s, the number of active offenders decreases by over 50%, and by age 28,
almost 85% of former delinquents desist from offending”). Moffitt notes that, at least
in the late 20th century, the “general relationship between age and crime [persists]
among males and females, for most types of crimes.” Id.
131. Terrie E. Moffitt, Natural Histories of Delinquency, in CROSS-NATIONAL
LONGITUDINAL RES. ON HUM. DEV. AND CRIM. BEHAV. 3, 29 (Elmar G.M. Weitekamp &
Hans-Jürgen Kerner eds., 1994) [Moffitt II] (noting that “[t]emorary, situational
antisocial behavior is quite common in the population, especially among
adolescents,” but specifying that “[p]ersistent antisocial behavior is found among a
relatively small number of males whose behavior problems are also quite extreme”).
This distinction is important when addressing antisocial personality among
offenders, as it indicated that antisocial behavior can change, and ultimately
dissipate, over time. Id. See Scott & Grisso, supra note 121, at 811 (noting that
“[l]awmakers usually defined immaturity through bright line rules that establish the
legal boundaries between childhood and adulthood for various purposes on the basis
of age”). Scott and Grisso further stated that “[f]rom a developmental perspective,
age is a convenient but imprecise marker of the maturation process. Id.
132. Antisocial personality disorder, MAYO CLINIC (Oct. 22, 2019),
www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/antisocial-personalitydisorder/symptoms-causes/syc-20353928
[perma.cc/35AV-BNVD]
(including
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condition in which a person consistently shows no regard for right or
wrong and ignores their rights and feelings of others.”133 Most juvenile
offenders do not develop “an entrenched pattern of criminal behavior
that persists into adulthood,”134 as most juvenile offenders move away
from criminal behavior as they mature.135 Characteristics and behaviors
associated with antisocial personality disorder, a highly correlative
disorder with criminal conduct, tend to decrease as juveniles mature
into adulthood.136 Thus, accounting for specific mental health factors is
vital when determining a juvenile’s likelihood of reoffending,
rehabilitative capacity, and nearness to adulthood.137
2.

Emotional Development: Emotional Intelligence & Criminal
Conduct

While cognitive development factors into a juvenile’s likelihood to
commit a crime and to reoffend, research indicates that emotional
intelligence grants insight into these behaviors as well.138 Emotional
intelligence is an individual’s “ability to perceive, manage, and reason
about emotions and to use this information to guide thinking and
behavior adaptively.”139 In a study conducted in the United States,
information about the symptoms, causes, risk factors, complications, and prevention
of antisocial personality disorder).
133. Id.
134. Brief for American Psychiatric Association et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (discussing the argument that
juveniles should not and cannot be equated with adults who commit similar offenses
due to a variety of factors, including maturity and psychological development). It also
notes that, according to Roper, “the same characteristics that render a juvenile less
culpable than adults suggest . . . that juveniles will be less susceptible to deterrence.”
Id. See also Moffitt I, supra note 129, at 685-86 (discussing the differences between
those juveniles whose antisocial personality traits pervaded their entire lives
compared to those who developed these traits during adolescence). It states a
previous longitudinal study indicated that of the juvenile boys studied, “12% . . . were
classified as new delinquents at age 13; they had no prior history of antisocial
behavior from age 5 to age 11.” Id. Their levels of delinquency increased above the
study’s self-reported average between the ages of eleven and thirteen. Id. “By age 15,
another 20% of this sample of boys” were qualified as new delinquents who had no
history of antisocial personality traits throughout their lives. Id. Finally, “[b]y their
mid-20s, at least three fourths of these new offenders were expected to cease all
offending.” Id. These findings indicate the effects of antisocial personality trait
development on juveniles, and importantly, the likelihood that the traits will
dissipate by young adulthood. Id.
135. Moffitt I, supra note 129, at 675 (analyzing antisocial behavior in juveniles
as it relates to criminal activity throughout adolescence).
136. Id. See also Moffitt II, supra note 131, at 29 (analyzing the development of
and changes in antisocial behavior as one ages and specifically during adolescence).
137. Moffitt I, supra note 129, at 675-76 (explaining the development of antisocial personality characteristics in youths and the increased frequency of criminal
offenses and deviance during juvenile years).
138. Sonja Milojevic et al., Bad Past, Gloomy Future: The Trait Emotional
Intelligence Profile of Juvenile Offenders, 94 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 295
(2016).
139. Rachel E. Kahn, Elsa Ermer, Peter Salovey, & Kent A. Kiehl, Emotional
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researchers examined a sample of incarcerated youth to determine
whether callous-unemotional traits, the affective characteristics
associated with psychopathy, are related to reduced emotional
intelligence.140 Researchers noted that youths with lower emotional
intelligence tend to experience psychological maladjustment, “including
externalizing and internalizing symptoms of aggression.”141 The study
concluded that while the juvenile offenders scored similarly to the
general population on emotional intelligence measures, a significant
relationship exists between high levels of callous-unemotional
characteristics and emotional processing abnormalities.142 The
researchers further found that youth with “high levels of [callousunemotional] traits may demonstrate impairment in ability [emotional
intelligence], especially with regard to later developing [emotional
intelligence] skills.”143 These results indicate the importance of
evaluating a juvenile’s emotional intelligence or callous-unemotional
traits, as low levels can explain the youth offender’s reason for offending
and likelihood to reoffend, as well as help identify proper
interventions.144
Other studies have specifically evaluated emotional intelligence in
delinquent youths compared to those in control groups.145 In Serbia,
researchers compared results on the Trait Emotional Intelligence
Questionnaire of male juvenile offenders with male adolescents (the
control group).146 Researchers evaluated the males’ scores on four
factors (i.e., Well-being, Self-control, Emotionality, and Sociability) and
fifteen facets (e.g., Adaptability; Emotion expression, management,
perception, and regulation; Social Awareness; Stress management).147
Intelligence and Callous-Unemotional Traits in Incarcerated Adolescents, 47 CHILD
PSYCHIATRY HUM. DEV. 903, 903 (2016).
140. Id. at 904, 906 (defining callous-unemotional traits as “the affective features
of psychopathy and providing examples of callous-unemotional traits in youth, such
as “lack of empathy/remorse, shallow affect, and callousness”). The study further
notes that juveniles with callous-unemotional traits tend to experience difficulties in
responding to and recognizing facial expressions, such as fear and sadness, and
signals of distress or pain, and they often “endorse social goals consistent with
deviancy and dominance . . . [viewing] aggression as an acceptable way to obtain
goals.” Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 914.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Milojevic et al., supra note 138, at 295-96 (noting previous research studies
addressing juvenile offenders and emotional intelligence). For instance, a 2013 study
out of Ireland and a 2002 study out of China found that juvenile detainees scored
significantly lower on emotional intelligence measures compared to control groups,
indicating that these results tend to be pervasive across the world, not just in the
United States. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 296 (discussing the study’s method and procedure, such that the
researchers compared a group of convicted juvenile offenders with a control group,
all of whom were of normal intellectual capacity; further, the juvenile group
contained twenty-five nonviolent offenders and twenty violent offenders which
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Results indicated significant differences between the delinquent youths
– those who had committed nonviolent or violent crimes – and the
control group.148 The scores suggested that juvenile offenders often
“exhibit lower self-efficacy when it comes to dealing with emotions
(differentiating and expressing their own, or recognizing and
empathizing with the feelings of others); . . . hold a less
positive/optimistic representation of themselves, their past, present,
and future; and . . . have more difficulties regulating affect, controlling
their impulses, and managing stress.”149 While some may argue that this
study is not persuasive as it examined only male juveniles in another
country, it nevertheless adds to the research previously discussed which
took place in the United States.150 While it does not examine female
offenders, it still accounts for the majority of juvenile offenders, as males
tend to outnumber females when it comes to arrests for the most
serious offenses.151 This study further indicates that juvenile offenders
experience lower levels of emotional intelligence than the general
population, specifically with handling emotions, having less optimistic
views of themselves and their lives, and regulating mental mechanisms,
such as affect, impulse, and stress.152

B. Deterrence: Will a Juvenile Actually Re-offend?
Studies over the years have addressed whether juveniles who are
transferred to the adult criminal justice system experience deterrence at
higher rates than those who remain in the juvenile justice system.153
Research regarding general deterrence has produced somewhat
inconsistent results with limited and not necessarily strong
conclusions.154 Most of the studies’ results indicate “that transfer laws,
at least as currently implemented and publicized, have little or no
general deterrent effect in preventing serious juvenile crime.”155
Similarly, specific deterrence has also been examined and studied
throughout the literature.156 The studies generally conclude that “youth
allowed intragroup analysis, as well).
148. Id. at 297.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Melissa Sickmund & Charles Puzzanchera, Juvenile Offenders and Victims:
2014 National Report, NAT. CTR. FOR JUV. JUST. 115, 118 (2014),
www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/nr2014/downloads/chapter5.pdf [perma.cc/Q4TN-J2Q4]
(providing a table that includes information on larceny-theft, simple adult, drug
abuse violations, and disorderly conduct offenses by gender, age, and race, and
indicates that of the 1,642,500 total juvenile arrests, only twenty-nine percent of
those were female).
152. Milojevic et al., supra note 138, at 297.
153. Richard E. Redding, Juvenile Transfer Laws: An Effective Deterrent to
Delinquency?,
U.S.
DEP'T
OF
JUST.
1,
3
(2008),
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/220595.pdf [perma.cc/6CBH-K8F6].
154. Id. at 3.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 4 (noting that “[c]riminal sanctions will only have deterrent effects if
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tried in adult criminal court generally have greater recidivism rates
after release than those tried in juvenile court.”157 According to a metaanalysis conducted in 2016, three studies indicated that transfer had no
effect on recidivism, one study indicated that transfer reduced
recidivism, and five studies indicated that transfer increased
recidivism.158 Additionally, three other studies indicated that transfer
increased felony recidivism, with two of those three studies showing
increases in violent felony recidivism.159 Therefore, while transfer might
decrease recidivism, it may also increase it, and “there is no reliable
basis on which to argue that scientific evidence exists for or against
transfer as a policy of specific deterrence.”160
While transferring juveniles to the adult system for certain offenses
in order to punish, rather than rehabilitate, is statutorily mandated
and/or permissible in many states, the goal of deterring other offenders
through punishment has not been significantly effective.161 Some may
argue that the results of the general deterrent studies should not be
persuasive in changing state laws because they are notably inconsistent,
and the specific deterrent studies tend to focus on violent rather than
nonviolent and drug offenders.162 However, these factors together
indicate that deterrence is not an adequate basis for transfer where
general deterrence is not consistently achieved and transferred
juveniles experience higher rates of re-offense than their counterparts
who remain in the juvenile justice system.163

potential offenders: (1) believed there is a likelihood of getting caught (2) believed
there is a significant likelihood of receiving a substantial sentence, and (3) consider
the risk of the penalty when deciding whether to offend”). It specifically notes that
while all of these factors are vital for deterrence to be effective, they mean nothing if
juveniles who they are targeted towards do not know they exist. Id.
157. Id. (discussing specific deterrence generally, as well as a specific 1996 study
in which the researcher concluded that “[j]uveniles with the highest recidivism rates
were those incarcerated after being tried in the criminal court . . . . [o]verall, youth
adjudicated in juvenile court had a 29-percent lower risk of rearrest than those tried
in criminal court”). Drug offenses were the one exception to this overall finding,
where being tried in “criminal court substantially reduced the risk of rearrest in
[drug] cases.” Id.
158. Stephen N. Zane, Brandon C. Welsh, & Daniel P. Mears, Juvenile Transfer and
the Specific Deterrence Hypothesis, 15 CRIM. & PUB. POL. 901, 908-10 (2016).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. See also Hahn et al., supra note 38, at 2 (discussing the differences
between the juvenile and adult court systems, and specifically noting “the traditional
juvenile court has acted ‘in the interests of the child’ and focused on rehabilitation
rather than punishment because juveniles are assumed to be more amendable than
adults to treatment”).
162. Zane, Welsh, & Mears, supra note 158, at 901.
163. Redding, supra note 153, at 3-4.
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C. State by State: Are We Doing This Right?
1. Illinois Juvenile Transfer Laws
a.

Automatic (mandatory) transfer

Illinois law includes a statutory exclusion, such that “any minor
who at the time of an offense was at least [sixteen] years of age and who
is charged with: (i) first degree murder, (ii) aggravated criminal sexual
assault, or (iii) aggravated battery with a firearm”164 must be prosecuted
in the state’s adult criminal court.165 Where the transfer age is relatively
close to the age of legal adulthood, Illinois’ statutory exclusion age
corresponds with psychological research findings that a juvenile who is
nearing adulthood has more likely achieved sufficient maturity and
psychological development than his younger counterparts.166 The
minimum transfer age of sixteen also exceeds the United Nations’
recommended transfer age of fourteen.167
b.

Presumptive transfer

In Illinois, a juvenile may be presumptively transferred to the adult
criminal court if a prosecutor files a petition for the juvenile to be
transferred based on the commission of certain felonies that do not fall
under the statutory exclusion.168 Certain criteria must be met.169 First,
“the minor has previously been adjudicated delinquent or found guilty
for commission of an act that constitutes a forcible felony under the laws
of this State or any other state.”170 Second, “the act that constitutes the
offense was committed in furtherance of criminal activity by an
164. 705 ILCS 405/5-130(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2021) (addressing the concept of
“delinquent minor” under Illinois law).
165. Id.
166. Scott & Grisso, supra note 121, at 811.
167. Nowak, supra note 127, at 20.
168. 705 ILCS 405/5-805(2)(a) (LexisNexis 2021) (addressing presumptive
transfer of juvenile offenders under Illinois law, specifically the process of a
prosecutor filing a petition to waive the juvenile court’s jurisdiction over an offender
aged fifteen years or older who is alleged to have committed a forcible felony). See
also Griffin et. al., supra note 69, at 5 (noting that when prosecutorial discretion
regarding transfer is statutorily granted, there typically is “no hearing, no evidentiary
record, and no opportunity for defendants to test (or even to know) the basis for the
prosecutor’s decision to proceed in criminal court”). Thus, prosecutorial discretion
can sometimes be viewed and employed as if it is a statutory exclusion, rather than a
discretionary or semi-discretionary transfer mechanism. Id.
169. 705 ILCS 405/5-805(2)(a) (LexisNexis 2021) (addressing presumptive
transfer of juvenile offenders aged fifteen years or older who committed a forcible
felony under Illinois law).
170. 705 ILCS 405/5-805(2)(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2021) (addressing the first prong
required for a presumptive transfer of juvenile offenders under Illinois law, such that
“the minor has previously been adjudicated delinquent or found guilty for
commission of an act that constitutes a forcible felony under the laws of this State or
any other state”).
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organized gang.”171 Third, “if the juvenile judge assigned to hear and
determine motions to transfer a case for prosecution in the criminal
court determines that there is probable cause to believe that the
allegations in the petition and motion are true.”172 A judge may use his
or her discretion when transferring the juvenile, but there is a
rebuttable presumption that he should be transferred.173 Finally, this
statute does not set a problematically low minimum age at which a
juvenile may be presumptively transferred, as it includes a minimum
transfer age of fifteen years or older.174 Thus, if a juvenile meets the
criteria, he can be transferred to the adult court system beginning at age
fifteen, which aligns with research suggesting the juvenile has reached
sufficient psychological development that allows him to understand his
actions as they relate to the law and prevent him from reoffending.175
However, while the court may use its discretion when transferring the
juvenile, it does not need to consider any specific factors or otherwise
the child’s best interest, and as such, does not align with traditional
transfer mechanisms that focus on individual characteristics, such as the
likelihood of rehabilitation.176
c.

Discretionary transfer

Under Illinois statute, if the prosecution moves for the juvenile to
be prosecuted in the criminal justice system, a juvenile court may use its

171. 705 ILCS 405/5-805(2)(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2021) (addressing the first prong
required for a presumptive transfer of juvenile offenders under Illinois law, such that
“the act that constitutes the offense was committed in furtherance of criminal activity
by an organized gang”).
172. 705 ILCS 405/5-805(2)(a) (LexisNexis 2021) (addressing presumptive
transfer of juvenile offenders under Illinois law, specifically the process of a
prosecutor filing a petition to waive the juvenile court’s jurisdiction over an offender
aged fifteen years or older who is alleged to have committed a forcible felony). See
also People v. Chapai, 2017 IL App (3d) 140037-U, at 2, 5, 9-10 (discussing a case in
which thirteen-year-old Chapai, already an adjudicated delinquent after committing a
retail theft at the age of eleven, committed an armed robbery). Based on Illinois state
law, the prosecution used this opportunity to file a juvenile delinquency petition and
a motion to transfer the juvenile to adult criminal court, which the court granted and
thus Chapai was transferred to and tried in the criminal court system. Id. At a bench
trial the judge found Chapai guilty and at thirteen years old, he received an adult
sentence of twenty-one years with a mandated thirteen-year firearm enhancement.
Id. The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed the judgment on appeal. Id. This case
demonstrates presumptive transfer in Illinois, such that the prosecution may petition
for transfer, and in such is granted, the juvenile will be subject to the adult sentencing
structure that may keep him in prison beyond the maximum time he could receive if
he remained in the juvenile justice system. Id.
173. 705 ILCS 405/5-805(2)(a) (LexisNexis 2021).
174. Id.
175. Hoeffel, supra note 121, at 40; Scott & Grisso, supra note 121, at 811.
176. Hahn et al., supra note 38, at 2 (noting that “an emphasis of the judicial
response to [juveniles’] deviant behavior should be on reform rather than, or in
addition to, punishment – in contrast to the punitive focus of the adult criminal
justice system”).
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discretion when determining whether to transfer the juvenile.177 The
court may consider the best interests of the public when deciding
whether to transfer a thirteen-year-old juvenile offender whose alleged
actions would “[constitute] a crime under the laws of [Illinois].”178 This
statute correlates well with the traditional mechanisms of the juvenile
justice system, in which judges could take into account extrinsic factors
when deciding whether the juvenile’s alleged offense is better suited for
criminal court than for juvenile court.179 However, it does not
specifically state that the juvenile’s best interests should be taken into
account.180 An Illinois juvenile court does not necessarily have to
consider factors such as the juvenile’s age, maturity level, and potential
for rehabilitation.181 For instance, a juvenile may express symptoms of
antisocial personality disorder but psychological evaluations do or
would indicate that the juvenile will likely outgrow such traits by the
age of adulthood. However, the judge does not necessarily have to
consider those findings when determining whether transfer is proper.182
Additionally, this statute allows discretionary transfer for juveniles
thirteen and older.183 Thus, it does not align with studies showing that
juveniles who have not neared the age of majority (eighteen) have not
achieved the psychological capacity to indicate criminal culpability.184
Similarly, according to the United Nations, the Illinois transfer law
breaches the recommended a minimum transfer age of fourteen by
allowing thirteen-year-olds, even discretionarily, to be transferred.185

177. 705 ILCS 405/5-805(3)(a) (LexisNexis 2021) (addressing discretionary
transfer of juvenile offenders aged thirteen years or older when transfer is in the best
interests of the public, under Illinois law).
178. Id.
179. Griffin et al., supra note 69, at 2.
180. Id.; 705 ILCS 405/5-805(3)(a) (LexisNexis 2021) (addressing discretionary
transfer of juvenile offenders under Illinois law, which specifically acknowledges the
“best interests of the public” but not those of the juvenile themself).
181. 705 ILCS 405/5-805(3)(a) (LexisNexis 2021); Griffin et al., supra note 69, at
2. See also Roper, 543 U.S. at 560 (discussing Eighth Amendment violations with
juvenile offenders and transfer mechanisms). Roper specifically holds, in part, “[t]he
prohibition against ‘cruel and unusual punishments,’ like other expansive language in
the Constitution, must be interpreted according to its text, by considering history,
tradition, and precedent, and with due regard for its purpose and function in the
constitutional design.” Id. This interesting take on juvenile transfer and the
Constitution reflects the discretionary transfer mechanism, such that both argue for
the analysis of extrinsic evidence – with cruel and unusual punishments, the history,
precedent, and so on, and with discretionary hearings, age, nature of the offense,
mental illness and/or development, and so on. Id.
182. 705 ILCS 405/5-805(3)(a) (LexisNexis 2021). See also Moffitt I, supra note
129, at 675, 86 (describing developments in the understanding of antisocial behavior
in juveniles and explaining that “self-reports of deviant behavior . . . merely reflect
the top of the deviance iceberg”).
183. 705 ILCS 405/5-805(3)(a) (LexisNexis 2021).
184. Scott & Grisso, supra note 121, at 811.
185. Nowak, supra note 127, at 20.
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2. Indiana Juvenile Transfer Laws
a. Automatic (mandatory) transfer
Under Indiana law, if a juvenile “has previously been convicted of a
felony or a nontraffic misdemeanor”186 and he is currently being
charged with what “would be a felony if committed by an adult,”187 then
the juvenile court must waive jurisdiction and the juvenile thus must be
charged in the adult court system. Unlike Illinois’ transfer statutes,
Indiana’s automatic transfer statute includes no mandatory minimum
age at which a juvenile must or may be transferred.188 Thus, the statute
does not align with traditional mechanisms of the juvenile justice
system as it does not allow the juvenile court to take any factors into
account and simply mandates that the juvenile be charged in the
criminal court system.189 Similarly, it allows juveniles who may be
cognitively unaware of the consequences of their actions due to limited
psychological development based on their ages to be automatically tried
in the adult court regardless of any rehabilitative consideration.190
b. Presumptive transfer
Indiana has two statutes that constitute presumptive transfer.191 If
a juvenile who is at least sixteen years of age at the time of the alleged
act is charged with a Class A or Class B felony that would be considered
a Level 1, 2, 3, or 4 felony, involuntary manslaughter, or reckless
186. BURNS IND. CODE ANN. § 31-30-3-6 (LexisNexis 2020) (stating, “Upon motion
by the prosecuting attorney, the juvenile court shall waive jurisdiction if it finds that:
(1) the child is charged with an act which would be a felony if committed by an adult;
and (2) the child has previously been convicted of a felony or a nontraffic
misdemeanor”).
187. Id.
188. Id.; 705 ILCS 405/5-130(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2021) (addressing the concept of
“delinquent minor” under Illinois law); 705 ILCS 405/5-805(2)(a) (LexisNexis 2021)
(addressing presumptive transfer of juvenile offenders under Illinois law, specifically
the process of a prosecutor filing a petition to waive the juvenile court’s jurisdiction
over an offender aged fifteen years or older who is alleged to have committed a
forcible felony); 705 ILCS 405/5-805(3)(a) (LexisNexis 2021) (addressing
discretionary transfer of juvenile offenders under Illinois law, which specifically
acknowledges the “best interests of the public” but not those of the juvenile
themself).
189. Griffin et al., supra note 69, at 2.
190. BURNS IND. CODE ANN. § 31-30-3-6 (LexisNexis 2020) (addressing the
automatic transfer of a juvenile who committed a felony and has a prior conviction
for “a felony or a nontraffic misdemeanor” pursuant to a prosecutor’s motion); Scott
& Grisso, supra note 121, at 811.
191. BURNS IND. CODE ANN. § 31-30-3-4 (LexisNexis 2020) (addressing the transfer
rule when there is probable cause to believe a juvenile, who is at least twelve years
old, committed what would be considered murder by an adult offender); BURNS IND.
CODE ANN. § 31-30-3-5 (LexisNexis 2020) (addressing Indiana’s presumptive waiver
of jurisdiction to adult court for juveniles, aged sixteen years or older, where there is
probably cause that such juvenile committed a certain level of felony, such as
involuntary manslaughter or reckless homicide).
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homicide under Indiana criminal statute, and evidence indicates
probable cause that he committed the crime, he must be transferred to
the criminal justice system.192 This statute aligns with psychological
research regarding cognitive and emotional development in
adolescents.193 It presumes transfer for juveniles who have allegedly
committed certain offenses only after the juveniles have attained an age
close to the age of legal adulthood, and thus likely have significantly
greater psychological development than their younger counterparts,
especially those who are younger than fourteen.194
Additionally, if a juvenile who is at least twelve years of age at the
time of the alleged act is charged with what would constitute murder if
he committed the same act as a legal adult, and evidence indicates
probable cause that he committed the crime, he must be transferred to
the criminal justice system.195 Unlike Indiana’s other presumptive
transfer statute, this law presumes transfer for youth offenders who,
due to their young age, are unlikely to have achieved cognitive and
emotional development.196 Older age can increase the likelihood that the
juvenile would fully understand the consequences of his actions, steer
away from pervasive peer pressure, and potentially outgrow antisocial
personality traits.197

192. BURNS IND. CODE ANN. § 31-30-3-5 (LexisNexis 2020).
193. Scott & Grisso, supra note 121, at 811.
194. Id.
195. BURNS IND. CODE ANN. § 31-30-3-4 (LexisNexis 2020) (addressing Indiana’s
transfer statute, such that where probable cause exists to believe a juvenile, aged
twelve years old or older, committed what would be considered murder by an adult
offender). See also J.T., 121 N.E.3d at 607, 610-11 (discussing a 2015 case in which a
twelve-year-old girl – in part, due to a preoccupation with fictional character
Laughing Jack – stabbed and killed her stepmother). Based on Indiana’s juvenile
presumptive transfer laws in Indiana, even though she was twelve years old and had
committed murder, the judge had discretion in transferring her, such that the court
could choose to transfer or not to transfer based on the best interest of the juvenile
and the public. Id. In turn, the judge chose to keep the juvenile in the juvenile justice
system rather than to send her to the adult criminal justice system. Id. The
prosecutor’s motion for transfer was heard by the court but denied. Id. The Court of
Appeals of Indiana affirmed the trial court’s ruling regarding transfer. Id. This case
demonstrates Indiana’s presumptive transfer statute and the impact that the court’s
discretion can have on a juvenile’s case. Id.; compare with Geyser, 394 Wis. 2d at 99
and Weier, 2016 WI App 67 at *1-2 (discussing a 2014 Wisconsin case with similar
facts but a dissimilar result based on Wisconsin’s statutory exclusion statute). See
also HARRIS & MOONEY, supra note 10, at 7 (noting that with the reformation of the
juvenile court system through the Illinois Court Act of 1899, “[c]ourt records for
juvenile proceedings were confidential to minimize the stigma children experienced
from being in the justice system,” which can be seen in the previously noted case,
State v. J.T., where the name of the offender was never released).
196. Hoeffel, supra note 121, at 40; Moffitt I, supra note 129, at 675, 686
(explaining how “[b]efore modernization, biological maturity came at a later age,
social adult status arrived at an earlier age, and rites of passage more clearly
delineated the point at which youths assumed new roles and responsibilities”).
197. Hoeffel, supra note 121, at 40; Moffitt I, supra note 129, at 675, 686
(explaining that “[c]ritical features of the [adolescent] development period are
variability in biological age, the increasing importance of peer relationships, and the
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Further, it must be noted that both statutes are subject to the
court’s discretion.198 The juvenile court may override this presumptive
transfer if it concludes that maintaining jurisdiction over the alleged
offender is in the child’s and the community’s best interest.199 This
provision in each statute aligns with traditional goals of the juvenile
justice system, in which the juvenile’s best interest is taken into account
when deciding whether transfer is appropriate.200 The court has the
opportunity to evaluate whether the juvenile meets certain
psychological criteria that impact his ability to be rehabilitated or
otherwise to outgrow tendencies that cause his alleged actions.201 While
both statutes presume transfer for certain offenders who are below the
age at which antisocial personality traits tend to peak (age seventeen),
they allow the court to consider the child’s best interest.202 Thus the
court can evaluate the alleged offender’s likelihood of reoffending based
on not only age and previous history, but also antisocial and other
psychological traits.203
c. Discretionary transfer
Finally, Indiana employs discretionary transfer for juveniles
fourteen years and older who commit heinous or aggravated acts or
have participated in “repetitive pattern[s] of delinquent acts,”204 as well

budding of teenagers’ self-conscious values, attitudes, and aspirations” – all of which
may contribute to delinquency during youth).
198. BURNS IND. CODE ANN. § 31-30-3-4 (LexisNexis 2020) (including a provision
such that the court may consider the best interests of the child and the public); BURNS
IND. CODE ANN. § 31-30-3-5 (LexisNexis 2020) (including a provision, just as that
included in §31-30-3-4, such that the court may consider the best interests of the
child and the public).
199. Id.
200. Griffin et al., supra note 69, at 2.
201. Id.; Moffitt I, supra note 129, at 675, 686 (analyzing antisocial behavior in
juveniles and the characteristics of adolescent years that may lead to juvenile
delinquency).
202. BURNS IND. CODE ANN. § 31-30-3-4 (LexisNexis 2020) (including a provision
such that the court may consider the best interests of the child and the public); BURNS
IND. CODE ANN. § 31-30-3-5 (LexisNexis 2020) (including a provision, just as that
included in §31-30-3-4, such that the court may consider the best interests of the
child and the public).
203. BURNS IND. CODE ANN. § 31-30-3-4 (LexisNexis 2020) (including a provision
such that the court may consider the best interests of the child and the public); BURNS
IND. CODE ANN. § 31-30-3-5 (LexisNexis 2020) (including a provision, just as that
included in §31-30-3-4, such that the court may consider the best interests of the
child and the public); Moffitt I, supra note 129, at 675, 686 (analyzing antisocial
behavior in juveniles as it relates to criminal activity throughout adolescence);
Moffitt II, supra note 131, at 29 (analyzing the development of and changes in
antisocial behavior as one ages and specifically during adolescence).
204. BURNS IND. CODE ANN. § 31-30-3-2 (LexisNexis 2020) (addressing Indiana’s
transfer process of a juvenile offender from an Indiana juvenile court). The relevant
portion of the statute is as follows:
Upon motion of the prosecuting attorney and after full investigation and
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as for juveniles who are at least sixteen years of age.205 Not only does the
discretionary transfer mechanism align with the traditional juvenile
justice system’s transfer system, but also these age minimums correlate
with psychological research.206 As previously noted, studies have
indicated that by the age of fourteen, and even more likely by the age of
sixteen, psychological development begins to align with that of an adult
counterpart.207 Further, both of Indiana’s discretionary statutes align
with the United Nations’ recommendation that the minimum age that a
juvenile should be tried in adult court is fourteen.208 Thus, Indiana’s
discretionary statutes closely align with traditional juvenile justice
goals, psychological research findings, and modern recommendations
for juvenile transfer.209
hearing, the juvenile court may waive jurisdiction if it finds that: (1) the child
is charged with an act that is a felony: (A) that is heinous or aggravated, with
greater weight given to acts against the person than to acts against property;
or (B) that is a part of a repetitive pattern of delinquent acts, even though less
serious; (2) the child was at least fourteen (14) years of age when the act
charged was allegedly committed; (3) there is probable cause to believe that
the child committed the act; (4) the child is beyond rehabilitation under the
juvenile justice system; and (5) it is in the best interests of the safety and
welfare of the community that the child stand trial as an adult.
Id.
205. BURNS IND. CODE ANN. § 31-30-3-3 (LexisNexis 2020) (addressing the ability
for a juvenile court to waive jurisdiction, where there is probable cause to believe
that a child aged sixteen years or older committed what would be a felony if
considered by an adult).
206. See Griffin et al., supra note 69, at 2 (discussing the history of juvenile justice
in the United States); HARRIS & MOONEY, supra note 10, at 18 (discussing the history of
the juvenile justice system and specifically noting that with the creation of the Illinois
Juvenile Court Act of 1899, “the court required youth offenders to be separated from
adults in prison and banned children younger than 12 from being detained in
prisons”); Hoeffel, supra note 121, at 40 (discussing the lack of cognitive risk factors
that place juveniles in a disadvantage as compared to adults); Moffitt I, supra note
129, at 675 (explaining the development of anti-social personality characteristics in
youths and the increased frequency of criminal offenses and deviance during juvenile
years); Nowak, supra note 127, at 20 (noting that the United Nations recommends a
minimum transfer age of 14); Scott & Grisso, supra note 121, at 811 (discussing
cognitive development amongst youth offenders compared to those of the general
population, as well as extrinsic factors that may impact a juvenile’s ability to
comprehend the consequences of his or her actions). See generally, Hahn et al., supra
note 38, at 2 (discussing the goals of the juvenile justice system).
207. Hahn et al., supra note 38, at 2; Scott & Grisso, supra note 121, at 811.
208. Nowak, supra note 127, at 20.
209. See Griffin et al., supra note 69, at 2 (discussing the history of juvenile justice
in the United States); HARRIS & MOONEY, supra note 10, at 18 (discussing the history of
the juvenile justice system and specifically noting that with the creation of the Illinois
Juvenile Court Act of 1899, “the court required youth offenders to be separated from
adults in prison and banned children younger than 12 from being detained in
prisons”); Hoeffel, supra note 121, at 40 (discussing the lack of cognitive risk factors
that place juveniles in a disadvantage as compared to adults); Moffitt I, supra note
129, at 675 (explaining the development of anti-social personality characteristics in
youths and the increased frequency of criminal offenses and deviance during juvenile
years); Nowak, supra note 127, at 20 (noting that the United Nations recommends a
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In Wisconsin, courts utilize a statutory exclusion.210 A child who
has attained the age of ten is considered a “juvenile delinquent”211 under
the law if he commits first degree intentional homicide, attempted first
degree intentional homicide, first degree reckless homicide, second
degree intentional homicide.212 Additionally, a juvenile of any age who
commits an assault or battery against an employee or officer while in a
correctional facility, or commits battery against a probation or parole
officer, is subject to the statutory exclusion and thus must be tried in
adult court.213 In these situations, a juvenile delinquent may motion for
reverse waiver so long as the juvenile proves certain factors, such as
that the adult system’s lack of adequate and necessary treatment for the
juvenile and that the juvenile does not need to remain in the adult
system to be deterred.214 This automatic transfer law violates traditional
norms of the juvenile justice system by requiring the juvenile to prove
that he should be sent to the juvenile court, rather than allowing the
court to consider extrinsic factors for why the juvenile should not be

minimum transfer age of 14); Scott & Grisso, supra note 121, at 811 (discussing
cognitive development amongst youth offenders compared to those of the general
population, as well as extrinsic factors that may impact a juvenile’s ability to
comprehend the consequences of his or her actions). See generally, Hahn et al., supra
note 38, at 2 (discussing the goals of the juvenile justice system).
210. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 938.183(1)(am) (LexisNexis 2021) (addressing “[j]uveniles
under adult court jurisdiction”).
211. Id.
212. Id. See also Geyser, 394 Wis. 2d at 99; Weier, 2016 WI App 67 at *2
(discussing a 2014 case in which two 12-year-old girls – in an attempt to “become
proxies for” the fictional mythical character Slenderman (also known as Slender
Man) – planned to stab and kill their friend). After luring her into a wooded area with
them in Waukesha, Wisconsin, they repeatedly stabbed her, and, believing she was
dead, they left her at the edge of the forest where she was eventually discovered by a
passerby. Id. The victim survived, and the two juvenile offenders were charged as
adults with attempted first degree intentional homicide in Wisconsin’s criminal court
system because they met the requirements for Wisconsin’s statutory exclusion,
which mandates that offenders who have attained the age of 10 and have committed
certain felonious conduct, including attempted first degree intentional homicide, be
charged in the adult criminal court system rather than the juvenile court system. Id.
As is permitted in Wisconsin, the juveniles petitioned for reverse waiver, but such
was denied and thus they remained in the adult system. Id. These two cases – which
share a case cite but can be found under either offender’s last name – plainly
demonstrate Wisconsin’s statutory exclusion and the opportunity for reverse waiver.
Id.; compare with J.T., 121 N.E.3d at 610-11 (discussing a 2015 Indiana case with
similar facts but a dissimilar result based on Indiana’s presumptive transfer statute).
213. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 938.183(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2021) (addressing “[j]uveniles
under adult court jurisdiction”).
214. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 970.032(2)(a-c) (LexisNexis 2021) (addressing transfer of
Wisconsin juvenile court’s jurisdiction).
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transferred to the adult system.215 Further, by mandating that certain
offenders who are only ten years old be tried in adult court, this statute
does not align with psychological findings which indicate that juveniles
below the age of majority, and specifically under the age of fourteen,
have not achieved significant psychological development, limiting their
understanding of the consequences of their criminal or otherwise risky
behaviors and allows them to fall victim to peer pressure.216
Additionally, while not all juveniles who commit crimes display
antisocial personality traits, many do exhibit these tendencies which
tend to dissipate in young adulthood.217 Once these traits dissipate as
maturity increases, the individual’s likelihood of reoffending is
significantly reduced.218 However, this statute requires that a juvenile —
who has not reached an age of maturity and whose criminal behavior
may stem from antisocial personality traits that he will likely outgrow
by the time he achieves young adulthood — prove that he requires
treatment in the juvenile justice system rather than punishment from
the adult system.219 Finally, Wisconsin’s statutory automatic transfer age
is significantly lower than the United Nations’ recommended minimum
age.220 While the reverse waiver provision importantly provides the
juvenile the opportunity to have his case transferred to the juvenile
justice system, the statutory exclusion itself violates traditional juvenile
justice mechanisms and contradicts relevant psychological research
findings.221
b.

Discretionary transfer

Unlike Illinois and Indiana, Wisconsin does not employ
presumptive transfer but does permit discretionary transfer under
certain circumstances.222 Wisconsin law allows discretionary transfer
215. Griffin et al., supra note 69, at 2.
216. Hoeffel, supra note 121, at 40 (acknowledging that research demonstrates
“developmental differences in adolescents that greatly impact their culpability, their
susceptibility for deterrence, and their capacity for competent participation in
criminal proceedings”); Scott & Grisso, supra note 121, at 811 (explaining the
developmental difference, including psychological immaturity, amongst pre-teens
and adolescents).
217. Moffitt I, supra note 129, at 685-86 (explaining how peer pressure during
adolescence influences delinquent behavior, particularly with those juveniles who
experience antisocial characteristics during those formative years).
218. Id.
219. Id.; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 970.032(2)(a-c) (LexisNexis 2021) (addressing transfer
of Wisconsin juvenile court’s jurisdiction).
220. Nowak, supra note 127, at 20.
221. Griffin et al., supra note 69, at 2; Moffitt I, supra note 129, at 685-86
(examining juvenile delinquency and the frequency of police contacts during
adolescence – the years when antisocial behavior often peaks before a decrease as
one ages); Nowak, supra note 127, at 20; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 938.183(1)(am)
(LexisNexis 2021) (addressing “[j]uveniles under adult court jurisdiction”).
222. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 938.18(1)(a-c) (LexisNexis 2021) (addressing the
conditions for “[w]aiver of juvenile court jurisdiction”). The relevant portion of the
statute is as follows:
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for a fourteen or fifteen year old offender, depending on the offense, if
the district attorney or the juvenile himself petitioners the court to
waive jurisdiction based on certain characteristics the juvenile
displays.223 To permit the transfer, the court must conduct a hearing and
decide that transfer is appropriate under the circumstances.224 This

(1) Waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction; conditions for. Subject to s. 938.183,
a petition requesting the court to waive its jurisdiction under this chapter
may be filed if the juvenile meets any of the following conditions: (a) The
juvenile is alleged to have violated s. 940.03, 940.06, 940.225 (1) or (2),
940.305, 940.31, 943.10 (2), 943.32 (2), 943.87 or 961.41 (1) on or after the
juvenile’s 14th birthday. (b) The juvenile is alleged to have committed a
violation on or after the juvenile’s 14th birthday at the request of or for the
benefit of a criminal gang, as defined in s. 939.22 (9), that would constitute a
felony under chs. 939 to 948 or 961 if committed by an adult. (c) The juvenile
is alleged to have violated any state criminal law on or after the juvenile’s
15th birthday. Id.
223. Id.; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 938.18(2) (LexisNexis 2021) (addressing the petition to
waive juvenile court jurisdiction). The relevant portion of the statute is as follows:
(2) Petition. The petition for waiver of jurisdiction may be filed by the district
attorney or the juvenile or may be initiated by the court and shall contain a
brief statement of the facts supporting the request for waiver. The petition for
waiver of jurisdiction shall be accompanied by or filed after the filing of a
petition alleging delinquency and shall be filed prior to the plea hearing,
except that if the juvenile denies the facts of the petition and becomes 17
years of age before an adjudication, the petition for waiver of jurisdiction may
be filed at any time prior to the adjudication. If the court initiates the petition
for waiver of jurisdiction, the judge shall disqualify himself or herself from
any future proceedings on the case.
Id.
224. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 938.18(5) (LexisNexis 2021) (addressing the criteria to
waive juvenile court jurisdiction). The relevant portion of the statute is as follows:
(5) Criteria for waiver. If prosecutive merit is found, the court shall base its
decision whether to waive jurisdiction on the following criteria: (a) The
personality of the juvenile, including whether the juvenile has a mental illness
or developmental disability, the juvenile’s physical and mental maturity, and
the juvenile’s pattern of living, prior treatment history, and apparent
potential for responding to future treatment. (am) The prior record of the
juvenile, including whether the court has previously waived its jurisdiction
over the juvenile, whether the juvenile has been previously convicted
following a waiver of the court’s jurisdiction or has been previously found
delinquent, whether such conviction or delinquency involved the infliction of
serious bodily injury, the juvenile’s motives and attitudes, and the juvenile’s
prior offenses. (b) The type and seriousness of the offense, including whether
it was against persons or property and the extent to which it was committed
in a violent, aggressive, premeditated or willful manner. (c) The adequacy and
suitability of facilities, services and procedures available for treatment of the
juvenile and protection of the public within the juvenile justice system, and,
where applicable, the mental health system and the suitability of the juvenile
for placement in the serious juvenile offender program under s. 938.538 or
the adult intensive sanctions program under s. 301.048. (d) The desirability
of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one court if the juvenile was
allegedly associated in the offense with persons who will be charged with a
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statute appropriately sets the minimum at fourteen or fifteen – aligning
with psychological research findings and the United Nations’
recommended minimum age for a juvenile to be tried in the adult
criminal court system.225 Further, this statute allows for a hearing that
promotes traditional juvenile transfer mechanisms, such as evaluation
of the juvenile’s characteristics and a hearing to evaluate the
circumstances surrounding potential transfer.226
4.

Missouri Juvenile Transfer Laws

a.

Automatic (mandatory) transfer

Similar to Indiana’s statutory exclusion, Missouri law mandates
that for a child, no matter his or her age, who has previously been
prosecuted and found guilty in the state’s criminal court system, “the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court over that child is forever terminated”227
and thus any future offenses will automatically be charged in the adult
court.228 Similar to Indiana’s statute, Missouri’s statute gives the court
no discretion regarding whether the child should or should not be tried
in the adult court system.229 Thus, the statute does not sufficiently align
with traditional juvenile justice goals and psychological research
regarding determinative characteristics for transfer, such as age,
maturity, and mental illness.230
crime in the court of criminal jurisdiction.
Id.
225. Moffitt I, supra note 129, at 675 (explaining the development of anti-social
personality characteristics in youths and the increased frequency of criminal offenses
and deviance during juvenile years); Nowak, supra note 127, at 20 (noting that the
United Nations recommends a minimum transfer age of 14); Scott & Grisso, supra
note 121, at 811 (discussing cognitive development amongst youth offenders
compared to those of the general population, as well as extrinsic factors that may
impact a juvenile’s ability to comprehend the consequences of his or her actions).
226. Griffin et al., supra note 69, at 2.
227. MO. REV. STAT. § 211.071(9) (LexisNexis 2020) (addressing the juvenile
court’s retention of jurisdiction over a juvenile offender after a petition for transfer
has been denied).
228. Id.
229. Griffin et al., supra note 69, at 2; Hoeffel, supra note 121, at 40.
230. See Griffin et al., supra note 69, at 2 (discussing the history of juvenile justice
in the United States); HARRIS & MOONEY, supra note 10, at 18 (discussing the history of
the juvenile justice system and specifically noting that with the creation of the Illinois
Juvenile Court Act of 1899, “[t]he court required youth offenders to be separated
from adults in prison and banned children younger than 12 from being detained in
prisons”); Hoeffel, supra note 121, at 40 (discussing the lack of cognitive risk factors
that place juveniles in a disadvantage as compared to adults); Moffitt I, supra note
129, at 675 (explaining the development of anti-social personality characteristics in
youths and the increased frequency of criminal offenses and deviance during juvenile
years); Nowak, supra note 127, at 20 (noting that the United Nations recommends a
minimum transfer age of 14); Scott & Grisso, supra note 121, at 811 (discussing
cognitive development amongst youth offenders compared to those of the general
population, as well as extrinsic factors that may impact a juvenile’s ability to
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Discretionary transfer

Similar to Wisconsin, Missouri does not employ presumptive
transfer but does permit discretionary transfer.231 Missouri’s primary
form of transfer is discretionary transfer, paralleling in many ways the
traditional juvenile justice system’s transfer goals and mechanisms.232 If
a juvenile commits a certain serious offense or commits at least two
unrelated offenses that would be felonies in the criminal court system,
then the juvenile court must hold a hearing and, through its discretion,
may transfer the case to the adult court system.233 The statute does not
specify an age at which transfer is allowed, and thus a child younger
than the United Nations’ recommended age of fourteen, or a child
otherwise not sufficiently psychological developed to be rightfully
transferred to the adult system, may be transferred to Missouri’s
criminal court through the discretionary transfer process.234 However,
comprehend the consequences of his or her actions).
231. MO. REV. STAT. § 211.071(1) (LexisNexis 2020) (addressing the process of
discretionary transfer in Missouri, including the requirement that a court order a
hearing and use its discretion in transferring certain juvenile offenders).
232. Id.; Hahn et al., supra note 38, at 2; Griffin, et al., supra note 69, at 2, 4-5
(providing a table that breaks down the states that allow juvenile transfer and the
various offenses that each state does or does not employ when utilizing discretionary
waiver, and further specifying that Missouri remains one of the few states that relies
solely on discretionary transfer, in addition to the Once An Adult, Always statutory
exclusion).
233. MO. REV. STAT. § 211.071(1) (LexisNexis 2020) (discussing the discretionary
transfer process in Missouri for juvenile offenders alleged to have committed a crime
“which would be considered a felony if committed by an adult”). See also Erin
Heffernan, Teen charged with murder of retired St. Louis police sergeant to be tried as
an
adult,
S T.
LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH
(June
11,
2019),
www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/teen-charged-with-murder-ofretired-st-louis-police-sergeant/article_26f22109-7c05-5b1f-b67e07d4ca205f04.html [perma.cc/N37N-WZU3] (discussing a recent Missouri case in
which Justin Mathews was charged in the juvenile court system with second-degree
murder, among other charges, after allegedly shooting a retired police sergeant). At
the transfer hearing, juvenile officer Marianna Macke Swier “testified that the
juvenile corrections system does not have a facility with the level of security needed
to hold someone accused of such a violent crime and, at 16, Mathews could be
released from juvenile detention in as soon as two years.” Id. Further, the juvenile
officer noted that before his arrest, Mathew “showed signs of ‘sophistication’ and
‘independence.’” Id. Based on Missouri’s discretionary transfer statute, the judge may
take into account various factors, including those testified to by the juvenile officer,
and thus the judge chose to transfer Mathews. Id. Thus, this case demonstrates
Missouri’s discretionary transfer mechanisms, such that even at age sixteen,
Mathews’ transfer remained subject to the court’s discretion and at his hearing,
evidence was presented not only to prove the effect of transfer on the public (e.g., the
violent nature of the crime, the level of security available at various prisons) but also
to demonstrate Mathew’s characteristics and traits beyond those exemplified by the
alleged crime (e.g., his sophistication and independence). Id.
234. MO. REV. STAT. § 211.071(1) (LexisNexis 2020) (addressing discretionary
juvenile transfer, but not including a minimum age of such transfer); Griffin et al.,
supra note 69, at 2 (explaining that juvenile transfer ages have changed throughout
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this transfer mechanism is ideal as it follows the traditional goals of the
juvenile justice system by using discretion in every case of potential
transfer to determine the best course for the juvenile and likely the
public as well.235 To better align with the traditional goals and modern
psychological research findings, including a minimum transferability age
would more closely align this statute with both traditional 20th-century
transfer mechanisms in which children under the age of twelve could
not be held in prisons, as well as psychological research findings and the
United Nations’ research recommendations.236
IV. PROPOSAL

A. Age Matters
This Comment proposes solutions to the issue of juvenile transfer
mechanisms in comparison with traditional transfer procedures and
modern research findings. Courts should reemploy traditional transfer
mechanisms that focus solely on discretionary, not automatic or
presumptive, transfer processes. If states decide to continue using those
modern transfer mechanisms, each transfer statute should include a
minimum transfer age of fourteen, at the very youngest. Finally, for
every discretionary and presumptive transfer hearing a juvenile should
be psychologically evaluated by a licensed professional and the judge
should consider the professional’s findings when deciding whether
transfer is proper.

the development of the juvenile justice system); Hoeffel, supra note 121, at 40
(discussing the developmental differences in juveniles over adolescent years as it
impacts criminal, or deviant, behavior); Nowak, supra note 127, at 20 (noting that the
United Nations’ study recommends a minimum transfer age of fourteen); Scott &
Grisso, supra note 121, at 811 (explaining the developmental difference, including
psychological immaturity, amongst pre-teens and adolescents).
235. MO. REV. STAT. § 211.071(1) (LexisNexis 2020) (addressing discretionary
juvenile transfer, including language permitting the court to use its discretion in
moving forward or dismissing the petition); Griffin et al., supra note 69, at 2; Hoeffel,
supra note 121, at 40; Nowak, supra note 127, at 20; Scott & Grisso, supra note 121, at
811.
236. See Griffin et al., supra note 69, at 2 (discussing the history of juvenile justice
in the United States); HARRIS & MOONEY, supra note 10, at 18 (discussing the history of
the juvenile justice system and specifically noting that with the creation of the Illinois
Juvenile Court Act of 1899, “the court required youth offenders to be separated from
adults in prison and banned children younger than 12 from being detained in
prisons”); Hoeffel, supra note 121, at 40 (discussing the lack of cognitive risk factors
that place juveniles in a disadvantage as compared to adults); Moffitt I, supra note
129, at 675 (explaining the development of anti-social personality characteristics in
youths and the increased frequency of criminal offenses and deviance during juvenile
years); Nowak, supra note 127, at 20 (noting that the United Nations recommends a
minimum transfer age of 14); Scott & Grisso, supra note 121, at 811 (discussing
cognitive development amongst youth offenders compared to those of the general
population, as well as extrinsic factors that may impact a juvenile’s ability to
comprehend the consequences of his or her actions).
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B. Resorting Back to Tradition
When Chicago first developed the juvenile court system, it
employed some drastic and necessary changes to the treatment of
juveniles in the justice system.237 Recognizing that children possess
neither the same legal capacity nor the maturity or intellectual and
emotional development of their adult counterparts, the Illinois Juvenile
Court Act of 1899 aimed to protect children.238 The juvenile justice
system maintained jurisdiction over all juveniles under eighteen, and in
each instance when the possibility of waiving the juvenile to the adult
criminal court existed, the court considered both the interests of the
public and the juvenile before granting transfer.239 This procedure is
ideal for a variety of reasons.
First, the traditional transfer process grants the court discretion in
every case.240 Automatic transfers and statutory exclusions require a
court to transfer the juvenile to adult court without consideration of any
extrinsic factors.241 Presumptive transfers require a court to presume
that transferring the juvenile is the correct process and the court may
take into account other interests.242 Whereas the traditional transfer
mechanism mandates that a judge considers the juvenile’s best interest
by considering relevant factors to a case.243 Such factors may include the
juvenile’s age, maturity, history in and out of the system, the likelihood
of rehabilitation, and the public’s wellbeing if the juvenile is tried in the
juvenile rather than the adult system.244 These factors can greatly
impact a juvenile’s behavior and thus may cause him/her to commit
crimes without fully understanding the consequences of his actions.245
Therefore, the court should always consider these factors when
determining whether the juvenile should be transferred or is better
suited for the juvenile system. Further, by granting the court discretion,
the court retains autonomy when employing juvenile transfer.
Still, traditional transfer procedures do not completely align with
best practices. The traditional transfer mechanism allows a court to
transfer any juvenile it deems fit.246 While this method is important as it
allows courts to retain autonomy over juvenile transfer, it does not
include a minimum age at which the court can actually consider the
possibility of transferring the juvenile into the adult system.

237. Snyder & Sickmund, supra note 9, at 83-84.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 86.
240. Id. at 85.
241. Griffin et al., supra note 69, at 2.
242. Id.
243. Snyder & Sickmund, supra note 9, at 83-84.
244. Id.
245. Hoeffel, supra note 121, at 40.
246. Snyder & Sickmund, supra note 9, at 83-84.
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Psychological research indicates that juveniles mature and
psychologically develop and thus are more likely to acquire the
cognitive capacity for culpability as they grow closer to the age of
majority.247 Further, the United Nations recommends a minimum
transfer age of fourteen.248 This Comment proposes that in addition to
implementing the traditional transfer mechanisms that allow for
discretion in every juvenile transfer case, courts should establish the
minimum age for transfer and thus for this discretionary case-by-case
evaluation, at a minimum age of fourteen.249

C. If Not Tradition, Consider Likelihood of Developmental
Maturity
Considering the drastic changes made to juvenile transfer laws in
the 20th-century through the implementation of various types of
transfer, it may be difficult to resort back to the traditional transfer
process. Thus, to accommodate pre-existing laws, this Comment
proposes that regardless of the transfer styles employed by a state, the
minimum age that a juvenile may be automatically, presumptively, or
discretionarily transferred should be at or above age fourteen. This
minimum age reflects the suggested age of psychological maturity,
culpability, and overall development, as well as the United Nations’
recommended minimum age of transfer.250 Preexisting laws that already
include this age minimum or include a minimum age above fourteen
should not be amended.
1.

Amending Illinois’ Juvenile Transfer Laws

While some Illinois law aligns with the suggested minimum age
requirements, others do not. Illinois’ statutory exclusion, which sets the
transfer age at sixteen, should not be altered.251 Similarly, Illinois’
presumptive transfer law designates fifteen as the minimum age for
presumptive transfer.252 Thus, such statute need not be amended unless

247. Scott & Grisso, supra note 121, at 811.
248. Nowak, supra note 127, at 20.
249. Id.; Scott & Grisso, supra note 121, at 811.
250. See Kahn et al., supra note 139, at 903 (discussing emotional intelligence
amongst youth offenders compared to those in the general population and how
limited emotional intelligence can impact the juvenile’s ability to connect others,
understand facial expressions, and so on). See also Nowak, supra note 127, at 20
(noting that the United Nations recommends a minimum transfer age of 14); Scott &
Grisso, supra note 121, at 811 (discussing cognitive development amongst youth
offenders compared to those of the general population, as well as extrinsic factors
that may impact a juvenile’s ability to comprehend the consequences of his or her
actions).
251. 705 ILCS 405/5-130(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2021) (addressing the concept of
“delinquent minor” under Illinois law).
252. 705 ILCS 405/5-805(2)(a) (LexisNexis 2021) (addressing presumptive
transfer of juvenile offenders under Illinois law, specifically the process of a
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to increase the minimum age.253 On the other hand, Illinois’
discretionary transfer law allows juvenile courts to waiver jurisdiction
over certain juvenile offenders once they reach the age of thirteen.254
Illinois should amend its discretionary transfer statute to reflect a
minimum transfer age of fourteen.255
2.

Amending Indiana’s Juvenile Transfer Laws

Some of Indiana’s juvenile transfer laws align with the proposed
minimum age of transfer, whereas other laws should be amended.
Indiana’s first presumptive transfer law sets a minimum transfer age of
sixteen, and the discretionary transfer law includes a minimum transfer
age of fourteen.256 Those two statutes do not require amendment where
they reflect the proposed minimum age of transfer. However, Indiana’s
statutory exclusion law includes no minimum age at which the juvenile
can be statutorily excluded from the juvenile court system. 257 Similarly,
one of Indiana’s presumptive transfer statutes presumes that a juvenile
who is at least twelve years old and charged with murder may be
transferred.258 Thus, Indiana should amend its statutory exclusion law
prosecutor filing a petition to waive the juvenile court’s jurisdiction over an offender
aged fifteen years or older who is alleged to have committed a forcible felony).
253. See Kahn et al., supra note 139, at 903 (discussing emotional intelligence
amongst youth offenders compared to those in the general population and how
limited emotional intelligence can impact the juvenile’s ability to connect others,
understand facial expressions, and so on). See also Nowak, supra note 127, at 20
(noting that the United Nations recommends a minimum transfer age of 14); Scott &
Grisso, supra note 121, at 811 (discussing cognitive development amongst youth
offenders compared to those of the general population, as well as extrinsic factors
that may impact a juvenile’s ability to comprehend the consequences of his or her
actions).
254. 705 ILCS 405/5-805(3)(a) (LexisNexis 2021) (addressing discretionary
transfer of juvenile offenders aged thirteen or older under Illinois law).
255. See Kahn et al., supra note 139, at 903 (discussing emotional intelligence
amongst youth offenders compared to those in the general population and how
limited emotional intelligence can impact the juvenile’s ability to connect others,
understand facial expressions, and so on). See also Nowak, supra note 127, at 20
(noting that the United Nations recommends a minimum transfer age of 14); Scott &
Grisso, supra note 121, at 811 (discussing cognitive development amongst youth
offenders compared to those of the general population, as well as extrinsic factors
that may impact a juvenile’s ability to comprehend the consequences of his or her
actions).
256. BURNS IND. CODE ANN. § 31-30-3-2 (LexisNexis 2020) (addressing Indiana’s
discretionary transfer process for a juvenile offender aged fourteen or older who is
alleged to have committed certain heinous acts); BURNS IND. CODE ANN. § 31-30-3-5
(LexisNexis 2020) (addressing Indiana’s presumptive waiver of jurisdiction to adult
court for juveniles, aged sixteen years or older).
257. BURNS IND. CODE ANN. § 31-30-3-6 (LexisNexis 2020) (addressing the
automatic transfer of a juvenile who committed a felony and has a prior conviction
for “a felony or a nontraffic misdemeanor” pursuant to a prosecutor’s motion, but
including no minimum age for such transfer).
258. BURNS IND. CODE ANN. § 31-30-3-4 (LexisNexis 2020) (addressing Indiana’s
transfer statute, such that where probable cause exists to believe a juvenile, aged
twelve years old or older, committed what would be considered Murder by an adult
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and the second presumptive transfer law to reflect minimum transfer
ages of fourteen.259
3.

Amending Wisconsin’s Juvenile Transfer Laws

While Wisconsin’s discretionary transfer statute aligns well with
the proposed minimum transfer age, Wisconsin’s automatic transfer sets
a shockingly low minimum age of transfer at a mere ten years old.260
Thus, Wisconsin should amend its automatic transfer statute to include
a minimum age of fourteen.261 Wisconsin does not employ presumptive
transfer, and thus no current Wisconsin statute can be amended.
However, if Wisconsin chooses to employ a presumptive transfer statute
in the future, it should include a minimum transfer age of at least
fourteen years of age.262
4.

Amending Missouri’s Juvenile Transfer Laws

Missouri’s juvenile transfer process greatly aligns with traditional
goals of the juvenile justice system, but some of Missouri’s laws should
be amended where they include no minimum ages at which juveniles
offender).
259. See Kahn et al., supra note 139, at 903 (discussing emotional intelligence
amongst youth offenders compared to those in the general population and how
limited emotional intelligence can impact the juvenile’s ability to connect others,
understand facial expressions, and so on). See also Nowak, supra note 127, at 20
(noting that the United Nations recommends a minimum transfer age of 14); Scott &
Grisso, supra note 121, at 811 (discussing cognitive development amongst youth
offenders compared to those of the general population, as well as extrinsic factors
that may impact a juvenile’s ability to comprehend the consequences of his or her
actions).
260. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 938.18(1)(a-c) (LexisNexis 2021) (addressing the
conditions for “[w]aiver of juvenile court jurisdiction” should a petition for such
transfer be filed); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 938.183(1)(am) (LexisNexis 2021) (addressing
“[j]uveniles under adult court jurisdiction” for those offenders who committed
offenses “on or after the juvenile’s tenth birthday).
261. See Kahn et al., supra note 139, at 903 (discussing emotional intelligence
amongst youth offenders compared to those in the general population and how
limited emotional intelligence can impact the juvenile’s ability to connect others,
understand facial expressions, and so on). See also Nowak, supra note 127, at 20
(noting that the United Nations recommends a minimum transfer age of 14); Scott &
Grisso, supra note 121, at 811 (discussing cognitive development amongst youth
offenders compared to those of the general population, as well as extrinsic factors
that may impact a juvenile’s ability to comprehend the consequences of his or her
actions).
262. See Kahn et al., supra note 139, at 903 (discussing emotional intelligence
amongst youth offenders compared to those in the general population and how
limited emotional intelligence can impact the juvenile’s ability to connect others,
understand facial expressions, and so on). See also Nowak, supra note 127, at 20
(noting that the United Nations recommends a minimum transfer age of 14); Scott &
Grisso, supra note 121, at 811 (discussing cognitive development amongst youth
offenders compared to those of the general population, as well as extrinsic factors
that may impact a juvenile’s ability to comprehend the consequences of his or her
actions).
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may be transferred. Neither Missouri’s statutory exclusion law nor its
discretionary transfer law includes a minimum transfer age263 and thus
they should be amended to include minimum transfer ages of
fourteen.264 Missouri does not employ presumptive transfer and thus no
current Missouri statute can be amended. However, if Missouri chooses
to employ a presumptive transfer statute in the future, it should include
a minimum transfer age of at least fourteen years of age.265

D. Psychological Evaluation and Consideration at Juvenile
Transfer Hearings
In addition to employing traditional transfer mechanisms or
otherwise amending statutes to reflect a minimum transfer age of
fourteen, courts should always consider cognitive and emotional
development when evaluating whether the juvenile is best suited for the
juvenile or the adult criminal court system.266 Considering a juvenile’s
263. MO. REV. STAT. § 211.071(1) (LexisNexis 2020) (addressing discretionary
juvenile transfer, but not including a minimum age of such transfer); MO. REV. STAT.
§ 211.071(9) (LexisNexis 2020) (addressing the circumstances when a child is
barred from adult court after conviction for an earlier crime, but including no
minimum age of such transfer).
264. See Kahn et al., supra note 139, at 903 (discussing emotional intelligence
amongst youth offenders compared to those in the general population and how
limited emotional intelligence can impact the juvenile’s ability to connect others,
understand facial expressions, and so on). See also Nowak, supra note 127, at 20
(noting that the United Nations recommends a minimum transfer age of 14); Scott &
Grisso, supra note 121, at 811 (discussing cognitive development amongst youth
offenders compared to those of the general population, as well as extrinsic factors
that may impact a juvenile’s ability to comprehend the consequences of his or her
actions).
265. See Kahn et al., supra note 139, at 903 (discussing emotional intelligence
amongst youth offenders compared to those in the general population and how
limited emotional intelligence can impact the juvenile’s ability to connect others,
understand facial expressions, and so on). See also Nowak, supra note 127, at 20
(noting that the United Nations recommends a minimum transfer age of 14); Scott &
Grisso, supra note 121, at 811 (discussing cognitive development amongst youth
offenders compared to those of the general population, as well as extrinsic factors
that may impact a juvenile’s ability to comprehend the consequences of his or her
actions).
266. Richard E. Redding, One Size Does Not Fit All: The Deterrent Effect of
Transferring Juveniles to Criminal Court, 15 AM. SOC’Y OF CRIM. & PUB. POL. 1, 6 (2016)
(noting that, “Juvenile justice practitioners and policy makers should recognize, as
the Zane et al. (2016) meta-analysis suggests, that one size of legal processing and
sanction does not fit all offenders and offenses”). Further, Redding argues, “Whether
done at the discretion of the prosecutor or judge or done automatically under state
law, transfer should be predicated on the juvenile’s treatment needs, offense history,
and community protection needs rather than on the violent nature of the charged
offense.” Id. See also Zane, Welshe & Mears, supra note 158, at 908-10 (discussing
various studies that address recidivism rates in juvenile offenders). See generally
Carol A. Schubert, et al., Predicting Outcomes for Youth Transferred to Adult Court, 34
L. & HUM. BEHAV. 460, 471 (2010) (acknowledging that “once the decision to transfer
a youth to adult court has been made, a rather formulaic approach, rooted in charge,
determines what happens with these youth, with little consideration given to
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developmental growth over the course of adolescence, every juvenile
should be evaluated to determine his or her maturity, cognitive
processing, and emotional development, as psychological research
indicates that juveniles learn over time the consequences of their
actions, how to avoid peer pressure, how to self-regulate mental
mechanisms, such as impulse and stress, and so on.267 Without
considering the juvenile’s development in these areas, a court cannot
fully understand why the juvenile might have acted in the way that
he/she did, whether the juvenile is psychologically mature enough to
have the culpability to commit the crime, and how the juvenile may or
may not be able to be rehabilitated in the juvenile versus the adult
criminal justice system. Thus, when the court has the option to employ
discretionary transfer, or when a juvenile is rebutting presumptive
transfer, a psychological evaluation of the juvenile, particularly
regarding cognitive and emotional development, should be completed
and considered by the court when determining the juvenile’s fate in the
juvenile rather than the adult criminal justice system.

V.

CONCLUSION

Just as juvenile transfer has an ever-changing history in our
country, juvenile minds and their understanding of the world grow each
and every day as they develop psychologically throughout their
youth.268 Still, state-by-state, legislatures have established transfer laws
that often stray far from traditional transfer mechanisms in which the
court should or must take into account the juvenile as a person, not
simply as an alleged offender.269 When two twelve-year-old girls in
Wisconsin attempted to kill their friend, they were not given a chance in
the juvenile court.270 Instead, Wisconsin law required that regardless of
the fact that they had not even reached their teenage years and thus had
limited psychological growth due to their ages, they had to be tried in
adult court.271 Had they committed their crime across state lines in
Illinois or Indiana, that result may have been quite different.272 The
juvenile justice system was founded on the doctrine of parens patriea,

individual factors”).
267. Id.; Milojevic et al., supra note 138, at 297.
268. Hoeffel, supra note 121, at 40 (noting that juveniles from those in young
adolescence to those nearing young adulthood show varying levels of psychological
development); Snyder & Sickmund, supra note 9, at 83-84 (discussing the history of
the United States juvenile justice system).
269. Steiner et al., supra note 66, at 35.
270. See e.g., Geyser, 394 Wis. 2d at 99, and Weier, 2016 WI App 67 at *1-2
(discussing the case of Geyser and Weier, two 12-year-old girls, who attempted to kill
their friend as a means of pleasing the fictional character Slender Man).
271. Id.
272. See e.g., J.T., 121 N.E.3d at 605 (discussing a case in which a twelve-year-old
offender stabbed and killed her stepmother, in part, as an attempt to please fiction
character Laughing Jack, similar case to Slender Man Stabbing case, Geyser, 394 Wis.
2d at 99, and Weier, 2016 WI App 67 at *1-2).
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“the State as parent,”273 and just as good parents put their children’s
needs and well-being before their own, state juvenile transfer laws
should do the same.

273. Snyder & Sickmund, supra note 9, at 83-84.

